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INTRODUCTION
The high seas (including the seabed) and outer space (including
celestial bodies) show every indication of becoming frontiers of
increasing economic and military interest and competition between
states, especially the two superpowers. This article is limited to a
comparative study of the legal aspects of military activity in these
two frontiers. Because much of that military activity requires a tech-
nology which only the United States and the Soviet Union currently
possess, or have the resources to develop, the article discusses the
demilitarization of the seas and outer space primarily from a Soviet-
American perspective. However, insofar as much of the effort to
demilitarize the high seas and outer space has taken place under the
auspices of the United Nations, and since much of the treaty law on
the subject' consists of U.N. sponsored multilateral conventions, the
ensuing discussion ought not to be read as a treatment of a question
that is exclusively bilateral or bipolar in nature. The treaties raise
legal problems of demilitarization of general interest to all states,
transcending any immediate superpower interest therein.
It should be apparent to even the most casual observer of the
current system of international relations that both outer space and
the high seas are and will continue to be areas of military interest to
many of the world's more powerful states. Submarines and other
sophisticated underwater strategic weapons systems are being devel-
oped for deployment in the vast reaches of the oceans. 2 As for outer
space, satellite bombardment systems and laser beam weaponry may
soon be a reality.3
In light of such technological developments, this article will
examine which" of the two frontiers presents a greater potential for
1. United Nations treaty law on the subject chiefly comprises the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention (see infra notes 28, 82 & 127), the 1971 Seabed Treaty (see infra note 36), the
1980 Draft Convention of UNCLOS III (see infra note 46), the Outer Space Treaty (see
infra note 50), and the Moon Treaty (see infra note 225). None of these treaties, how-
ever, are bilateral.
2. See Evensen, Present Military Uses of the Seabed and Foreseeable Developments,
3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 121, 124-26 (1970).
3. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
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military use as well as how the international community has begun
to regulate such use. Each frontier poses its own unique possibilities;
hence the study is divided into two distinct but interrelated parts.
The article will examine and compare the military potential of both
the high seas (and the seabed) and of outer space. It also will
describe traditional as well as comparatively recent military uses to
which they have been put.4 In addition to the use of the sea and
space for strategic weapons, there is the thorny problem of the use of
these two frontiers for "defensive" purposes; principally, for surveil-
lance, verification and detection. These non-agressive and non-vio-
lent uses also raise significant military questions.
It is against the background of these challenges that the article
will measure the adequacy of the treaty law governing military activ-
ity in the oceans and in outer space. It will analyze the treaties' pro-
visions in terms of their effectiveness in achieving the goals of
demilitarization, as well as analyze how state conduct has worked to
achieve the same goals. This approach has a dual purpose: to indi-
cate the limitations of any large-scale effort to restrict state conduct
through "treaty law" and, perhaps ironically, to use state conduct
itself as a guide to the interpretation of the appropriate treaties and
conventions. Finally, the article presents concluding reflections on
the future prospects for demilitarization of the seas and outer space.
I
PROBLEMS OF 'PEACE' IN THE EVOLVING LAW
OF THE SEA
A. INTRODUCTORY NOTE ON THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
POTENTIAL OF THE HIGH SEAS
There are two primary reasons for the growing superpower
interest in the high seas: the use of the sea and seabed for military
purposes, and the exploitation of the sea's living and nonliving eco-
nomic resources.
Until recently, the economic potential of the oceans has been
largely untapped. When it has been tapped, the activity has been
almost invariably unregulated, and has led to pollution, overfishing
and a reduction of the quality of fish stocks.5 International regula-
4. The current international practice is to treat matters relating to the use of nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction separately from matters relating to the use of
conventional weapons. Both of these uses on the earth's land mass pose grave questions
for mankind, and, if extended to the high seas and outer space, present even more formi-
dable challenges.
5. In the field of fisheries, a study by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations indicates that major fishing areas of the world are fast reaching their
maximum potential fish yield. Pabst, MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 85 (1976).
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tion could not only reduce or eliminate these problems, but it could
also result in a "blue revolution" of even greater importance than the
"green revolution" of recent years.6
While today offshore drilling provides some twenty percent of
the world's total oil production, by the mid-1990's it will account for
almost fifty percent of global production. 7 The mineral resources of
the seabed are in such great abundance that once they become com-
mercially exploitable through the requisite technological and legal
developments, they could meet substantial percentages of the world's
mineral needs.8 Advances in marine geology also will undoubtedly
lead to additional discoveries of mineral deposits in the seabed.
Other growing areas of ocean activity include ocean transporta-
tion and communications, and underwater storage and recreational
facilities.9 Factories, industries and oil refineries are being moved to
man-made floating platforms or artificial islands.'0 In short, in the
years to come the oceans will open up a vast frontier for a new
industrial civilization that will depend on the sea for its survival.
Yet the future importance of the oceans will transcend the
purely economic aspect of man's existence or survival. The sea and
seabed are fast becoming areas of strategic and military interest, par-
ticularly for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Both powers are aware that
technological advances in multiple-warhead missile systems as well
as in observational systems have made land-based strategic weapons
systems vulnerable to attack." 1 Even the deployment of anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) systems does not significantly offset the threat posed
by Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) sys-
Evidence of over-fishing is also well-documented. See id at 85-86. For a discussion of
international efforts to deal with the problem of oil pollution of navigable waters through
international agreement, see id at 107-24.
6. See generaly, C. Ray, Ecology, Law and the Marine Revolution, in PACEM IN
MARIBus 6 (E. Borgese ed. 1972).
7. J. Charney, The Equitable Sharing of Revenues from Seabed Mining, in POLICY
IssuES IN OCEAN LAW 53, 69 (1975).
8. Studies indicate that a substantial portion of the world's needs for copper, cobalt,
nickel and manganese can be satisfied by economically efficient exploitation of the deep
seabed. See D. Johnson & D. Logue, U.S. Economic Interests in Law of the Sea Issues, in
THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 37, 37-47 (C. Amacher & R.
Sweeney eds. 1976).
9. J. Craven, Ocean Arms Control, in QUIET ENJOYMENT: ARMs CONTROL AND
POLICE FORCES FOR THE OCEAN 155, 155-71 (1970).
10. "Floating nuclear plants" are discussed in Kindt, The Offshore Siting of Nuclear
Power Plants, 8 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L LAW J. 57, 64-65 (1980). See also Nanda, The
Legal Status of Surface Devices Functioning at Sea Other Than Shifs, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L.
233 (1978).
11. Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Apfpraisal of Interna-
tional Lawmaking, 74 Am. J. INT'L LAw 48, 48-50 (1980). Reisman explains that land-
based missiles have a "preemption and first-strike attraction" that adversaries may not
ignore. He suggests that submarine missiles offer a more reliable deterrent. Id at 50-51.
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tems.12 Thus, moving strategic weapons from land into the protec-
tive opaqueness of the sea is currently a highly attractive
proposition. 13 Such a move could 'be geared to improve a state's
offensive and defensive capabilities 14 through squadrons of subma-
rines, fixed submarine detection systems and other manned and
unmanned underwater weapons systems. 15
The concept of undersea deterrence is not based on the belief
that no single vessel can be destroyed by the enemy.16 Instead, it is
based on the principle that an undersea system is nontargetable at
any given time. Consequently, in the event of attack, enough vessels
would survive to strike back. 17
An undersea deterrent system would also provide longer reac-
tion time in a crisis situation. 18 Even the basing of missile systems
on the surface of the sea could make them less vulnerable than land-
12. N. Brown, Military Uses of the Ocean Floor, in PACEM IN MARIBUS, Supra note 6,
at 285. Mr. Brown suggests that ABM's be deployed in the oceans to intercept MIRV's
before the warheads separate. Id at 291.
Another possible development is the placement of the controversial MX missile system
on hundreds of conventionally powered submarines. Indications at the time of this writ-
ing (September 1982) are, however, that a land-based version of the system is likely to
win final approval.
13. THE TIDES OF CHANGE 78 (E. Borgese & D. Krieger eds. 1975). See also
Hirdman, Prospectsfor Arms Control in the Ocean, in id at 80-89; Reisman, supra note
11, at 48, 50.
14. E. Brown, ARMS CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE 12-14 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
ARMS CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE].
15. One study states the advantages of underseas weapons systems as follows:
The absorption of water with respect to light, high-energy particles, electro-
magnetic radiation, heat and other known forms of energy is such that, except
for acoustic radiation, none of the mechanisms postulated has a detection range
potential which is significant when compared with the vast areas available in the
ocean. The ultimate test in this regard is the ability of the submersible to blend
with and be masked by the environment. At near zero speed this ought to be
quite attainable. The hotel load for life support and weapons readiness is mod-
est, and if, for example, power is supplied by fuel cell, the machinery associated
with it should be extremely quiet. Drifting in the current, at great depth or at
low speeds, the hydrodynamic wake would be insignificant. A further aid would
be the capability to move very close to the bottom, rendering the submersible
difficult to detect by long-range, active sonar. Ultimately, the underseas weap-
ons systems could develop into something akin to a manned on-the-bottom,
slowly mobile mine.
J. Craven, Ocean Technology and Submarine War/are, in THE IMPLICATIONS OF MILI-
TARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1970's (Adelphi Paper No. 46) 38, 41-42 (London 1968).
16. SIPRI YEARBOOK OF WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENTS 1968/69, 99-
100 (1970).
17. Id Ideally, greater protection gained through the ability to hide underwater
ensures at least a "second strike" capability. Reisman, supra note 11, at 52-53.
18. This would particularly apply to nuclear weapons, the hasty use of which could
create an untold amount of unnecessary damage. In the event of a crisis, longer reaction
time would permit a sober and more rational assessment of the most prudent measures of
retaliation. N. Brown, supra note 12, at 285, 291. See also E. Brown, 7he Legal Regime
o/ Inner Space, 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 181, 183 (1969).
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based systems, especially if they are mounted on very fast surface-
effect vehicles, prototypes of which are already being built in the
United States.19
In view of each of these advantages, the potential for militariza-
tion of the seas and the seabed could be extensive.20 It is clear that
contemporary oceanological research relating to the economic
exploitation of the seabed cannot take place without the preservation
of the oceans as a zone of peace. The need to reserve the oceans for
peaceful uses is even more urgent in light of their potential for mili-
tary use. The following sections examine whether current treaty law
fulfills that need.
B. THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SEABED: CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL ASPECTS
The current legal regime for the demilitarization of the seabed
has evolved in a unique manner, initiated largely through the trad-
ing of unilateral proposals and counterproposals between the United
States and the Soviet Union.2' Concerted criticisms of different
aspects of the proposals of both superpowers led to the eventual
adoption of the current treaty law; law which is fraught with uncer-
tainties. One may attribute the uncertainties, in part, to the fact that
the treaty law that did evolve was the legal expression of a series of
political compromises.
In 1969 both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted
draft treaties22 to the Geneva Conference of the Eighteen Nation
19. SIPRI YEARBOOK OF WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENTS 1969/70 95
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI YEARBOOK 1969/70].
20. Drastic cutbacks in both powers' space programs have diverted research in the
aerospace industry from outer space to "inner space"--the oceans. United States aero-
space firms have directed their surplus capacity toward the development of prototypes of
various kinds of submersibles and equipment for ocean use. The result is that contempo-
rary oceanological research has become increasingly oriented towards the military. L.
Ritchie-Calder, In Quiet Enjoyment, in PACEM IN MARIBUS, supra note 6, at 260, 262.
See also E. Young, Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ocean, in id at 268-69.
21. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying.text. The first serious attempts at the
international level to reserve the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes did not occur until 1967. In that year the United Nations
established a seabed committee to study different aspects of this endeavor. U.N. Doc. A/
Res./2340 (1968). See also U.N. Doc. A/Res./2467 (1968).
22. United States of America: Draft Treaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor,
U.N. Doc. ENDC/249 (1969) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft Treaty], reprinted in OFFI-
CIAL RECORDS OF THE DISARMAMENT CoMMIssIoN Annex C, at 25 (1969 Supp.); Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Use for Military Pur-
poses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, U.N. Doe. ENDC/
240 (1969), [hereinafter cited as U.S.S.R. Draft Treaty] reprinted in id, at 14.
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Disarmament Conference (ENDC).23 The Soviet draft treaty advo-
cated total demilitarization of the seabed and ocean floor,24 in keep-
ing with the Soviets' concern that a prohibition limited to weapons
of mass destruction could lead to the development of a conventional
arms race in the oceans. 25 The U.S. draft treaty called for
denuclearization of the seabed environment. 26 As a major naval
power, the United States was not prepared to accept a ban on all
military activities on the seabed. It argued that complete demilitari-
zation could in fact threaten a state's security if that state was not
able to adequately defend itself in the seas. 27
In an attempt to produce a mutually acceptable treaty, the two
powers exchanged proposals and counterproposals in their capacities
as cochairmen of the Disarmament Conference. Early in October
1969, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed on a joint draft treaty which
provided that the parties would not emplant or emplace on the sea-
bed and the ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof beyond a certain
area, any objects with nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruc-
tion, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facili-
23. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) was created in 1961 to
provide a forum in which member nations could discuss disarmament questions of com-
mon interest, particularly with respect to nuclear disarmament. G.A. Res. 1722, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/4980/Add.2 (1961). Originally comprised of
eighteen members, the ENDC admitted several other states in 1969. In August 1969, the
ENDC was renamed "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD). U.N.
Doc. DC/232 (1969). For an extensive description of the ENDC's activities, see THE
UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 1945-70, at 108-89 (1970).
24. U.S.S.R. Draft Treaty, supra note 22 at art. I. This proposal was in keeping with
the Soviet Union's request in 1968 that the ENDC take up the "question of prohibiting
the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor." U.N. Doc. A/AC135/
20 (1968).
25. The Soviet Draft Treaty sought to prohibit the placement of objects with nuclear
weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and
the subsoil thereof, as well as the setting up of military bases, structures, installations,
fortifications and other objects of military nature beyond the 12-mile maritime zone of
coastal states. U.S.S.R. Draft Treaty, supra note 22, at art. I. The Soviet Draft Treaty
also proposed that all installations and structures on the seabed and the ocean floor and
the subsoil thereof would be open to inspection on a reciprocal basis by any state party to
the treaty. Id art. II.
26. U.S. Draft Treaty, supra note 22, at art. I. The Treaty prohibited fixed nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms
on, within, or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a three-mile band adjacent to
the coast of any state. Id The U.S. Draft Treaty also provided that each state has the
right to observe other states' activities on the seabed and ocean floor without interference.
Id art. III, para. 1. Finally, the U.S. Draft Treaty proposed a scheme for mutual consul-
tation between states in the event that there were doubts concerning the observance of
the Treaty's provisions. Id See also U.N. Doc. A/AC135/24 (1968).
27. See Barry, The SeabedArms Control Issue 1967-71: A Superpower Symbiosis?, 61
INT'L LAW STUD. 572, 577 (U.S. Naval War College, R. Lillich & J. Moore eds. 1980).
The U.S. also objected to a Soviet proposal that permitted reciprocal verification of
seabed installations and structures. See 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 30-31, U.N.
Doc. A/7601 (1969).
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ties specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.28
The other member nations of the United Nations severely criti-
cized the joint draft treaty and refused to ratify it.29 Criticism cen-
tered around the rights of coastal states under the draft treaty,30 its
verification provisions3' and the veto power it accorded to nuclear
weapons states.32 The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. submitted second 33 and
third34 revised joint treaties, each of which failed to gain majority
approval. Finally, in late 1970, the drafting efforts of the two nations
resulted in a final draft35 that an overwhelming majority of member
states adopted. On February 11, 1971, the Treaty on the Prohibition
of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of
28. Joint American-Soviet Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, U.N. Doc. CCD/269 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
First Draft Treaty].
The area indicated was the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The contiguous
zone consists of the 12 miles that extend from a nation's shores seaward. The Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as the 1958 Territo-
rial Sea Convention]. In essence, the First Draft Treaty represented an exchange of a
widening of the exempted zone to 12 miles for an agreement that the treaty should
encompass only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 5, 1969, at A12, col. 7. For further description of the First Draft Treaty's
provisions, see in Leonard, U.S. and U.SS.R Agree on Draft Treaty Banning Emplace-
ment of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed, 61 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 365 (Nov. 3, 1969).
29. Barry, supra note 27, at 579-80.
30. Coastal states objected to the First Draft Treaty because it failed to clearly define
the status of the region between the 12-mile limit and the outer boundary of territorial
waters. Under the treaty, it arguably would be possible for one state to legally emplant
weapons within 12 miles of the coast of another state. Id at 580.
31. The First Draft Treaty provided that "States Parties to the Treaty shall have the
right to verify . . . using [their] own means or with the assistance of any other State
Party." First Draft Treaty, supra note 28, at art. III. States which lacked the technical
resources to carry out verification operations recommended that the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral be given the power to assist in supervising compliance when complaining states
could not verify compliance themselves. Barry, supra note 27, at 580.
32. The First Draft Treaty provided that a majority vote, including an affirmative
vote by all nuclear powers, was necessary for amendment of the treaty. First Draft
Treaty, supra note 28, at art. IV. Critics of this provision voiced fears that such a require-
ment would foster a nuclear power monopoly over a demilitarization of the seabed.
Barry, supra note 27, at 580.
33. U.N. Doc. CCD/269/Rev.I (1969). The Second Draft Treaty provided a right of
recourse to the U.N. Security Council in the event of serious doubts concerning fulfill-
ment of the treaty obligations, a provision for a review conference, and an equal vote to
all parties on all future amendments. Id arts. III, IV & V.
34. U.N. Doc. CCD/269/Rev.2 (1970). Again, the drafting efforts of the two powers
failed to gain majority approval. Critics demanded that a binding committee be estab-
lished to continue negotiations for further measures to prohibit military use of the sea-
bed, that the treaty make verification a matter of international regulation, and that it
respect the sovereign rights of coastal states. See Barry, stpra note 27, at 580-81.
35. U.N. Doc. CCD/269/Rev.3 (1970). The Disarmanent Committee submitted the
final draft to the First General Assembly Committee for debate in early 1970. 25 U.N.
GAOR Annex A (Agenda Item Nos. 27-31, 93-94) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/8198 (1970).
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Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof (1971 Seabed Treaty) was simultaneously executed
in Moscow, Washington, D.C. and London.36
The opening article of the 1971 Seabed Treaty reflects its pri-
mary purpose:
The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the
seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit
of a seabed zone .... any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of
mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.
37
The prohibited zone is coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit
of the zone referred to in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.38
Thus, the 1971 Seabed Treaty's essential proscription with respect to
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is limited to the
deployment of such weapons39 beyond the twelve-mile zone sur-
rounding a signatory's shores.40
36. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (effective May 18, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Seabed Treaty].
37. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. I. Article I of the 1971 Seabed Treaty
refers to the deployment of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons which have been
tested and are ready for use. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, on the other hand, prohibits
any nuclear explosion, whether before, at or beyond the testing stage. It provides in part:
1. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not
to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,
at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water,
including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be
present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or con-
trol such explosion is conducted.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 45 (effec-
tive Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Test Ban Treaty].
38. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. II. Part II of the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention provides in part:
I. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state
may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regu-
lations within its territory or territorial sea,
(b) punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its terri-
tory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the base-
line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 28, at art. 24.
39. See supra note 37.
40. The scope of the prohibition under the Test Ban Treaty is more wide-ranging
ratione loci, it applies to tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, in territorial waters and
the high seas, as well as "in any other environment if [the] explosion causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or
control such explosion is conducted." Test Ban Treaty, supra note 37, at art. I. The
phrase "in any other environment" would include areas such as the subsoil of a state's
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To ensure compliance with its provisions, the 1971 Seabed
Treaty provides a scheme for verification of state activity. 4' States
may verify whether another state is complying with the Treaty's pro-
visions either through individual observation or through bilateral
and multilateral consultation. If observation and consultation do
not provide adequate verification, any state may refer the matter to
the Security Council, "which may take action in accordance with the
Charter. ' 42 The verification process may not interfere either with
the activity being observed or with the traditional freedoms of the
high seas.43
Any party may propose amendments to the Treaty; amend-
ments may come into force "for each Party accepting the amend-
ments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the
Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of
acceptance by it."44 Finally, the Treaty also contains an escape
clause whereby any signatory has "the right to withdraw from this
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country." 45
C. THE CONTROVERSY OVER "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" REVISITED
rN LIGHT OF THE 1971 SEABED TREATY AND THE
DRAFT CONVENTION OF UNCLOS III
The 1971 Seabed Treaty, perhaps because it is essentially the
legal expression of a political compromise, contains numerous flaws
and ambiguities. The Treaty's primary purpose may be defeated if
these ambiguities are not clarified. As it stands now, signatories to
the 1971 Seabed Treaty may avoid complying with its essential pro-
territorial waters. If an explosion conducted in the subsoil of territorial waters does not
cause radioactive debris beyond a state's territorial and jurisdictional limits, however, the
explosion would fall outside the scope of the Test Ban Treaty. The same would apply to
the subsoil of the high seas, although it is arguable that all explosions there are prohib-
ited regardless of whether or not they cause radioactive debris outside territorial limits,
since the subsoil of the high seas would, for the testing state, be a place "beyond its
limits" and therefore prohibited under the Test Ban Treaty.
41. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. III paras. 1-3.
42. Id art. III, para. 4.
43. Id art. III, para. 1. All verification activity must be conducted "with due regard
for rights recognized under international law including the freedoms of the high seas and
the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their conti-
nental shelves." Id art. III, para. 6. For a description of the traditional freedoms of the
high seas, see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
44. Id art. VI.
45. Id art. VIII. Another article provides that the parties "undertake to continue
negotiations in good faith concerning -further measures in the field of disarmament for
the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof."
Id art. V.
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visions, arguably without violating its terms. The recent draft con-
vention of the Ninth Session of UNCLOS III, the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Draft Convention),46
appears to permit the same. Neither document requires signatories
to limit their activities to non-military ones.
L "Peaceful Purposes" and the 1971 Seabed Treaty
An area of ambiguity central to the 1971 Seabed Treaty's effec-
tiveness concerns its reference to "peaceful purposes." The pream-
ble declares that the parties recognize "the common interest of
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and
the ocean floor for peaceful purposes. ' 47 The term "peaceful pur-
poses" is undefined and has generated conflicting interpretations.48
This controversy did not originate with the 1971 Seabed Treaty; it
first attracted attention with the coming into force of the Antarctic
Treaty49 in 1961, and again in 1967 with the coming into force of the
Outer Space Treaty.50
The preamble to the Antarctic Treaty provides that the parties
recognize that "it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica
shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
and shall not become the scene or object of international discord."5 '
The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty contains a provision almost
identical to that contained in the 1971 Seabed Treaty; the Parties are
to recognize "the common interest of all mankind in the progress of
the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. '5 2 The
Outer Space Treaty also provides that "[t]he moon and other celes-
tial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively
46. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea of the Ninth Session of the
UNCLOS III, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention].
47. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at preamble.
48. 0. Ogunbanwo, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIEs 28-33
(1975). Mr. Ogunbanwo explains that two schools of thought have emerged with respect
to the proper interpretation of the term "peaceful purposes." One interprets the term to
mean "non-military," while the other interprets it to mean "non-aggressive." Id at 28.
See also SIPRI YEARBOOK 1969/70, supra note 19, at 157-63.
49. The Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961).
50. Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 510 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Outer Space Treaty].
5 1. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 49, at preamble. The first article also provides that
Antarctica "shall be used for peaceful purposes only" and that "any measures of a mili-
tary nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying
out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons" shall be prohib-
ited. Id at art. I.
52. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at preamble.
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for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installa-
tions and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden." 53
It could be argued that in the context of the Antarctic and the
Outer Space Treaties, the term "peaceful purposes" means "non-mil-
itary purposes." The Antarctic Treaty prohibits "any measures of a
military nature."54 The broad sweep of this phrase would seem to
indicate that all military activity is prohibited, whether for offensive
or defensive purposes. All defensive acts are of a military nature
and all measures taken in preparation for such acts cannot therefore
be for a "peacefulpurpose." The same interpretation arguably could
be given to the Outer Space Treaty which, in fact, employs even
stronger language by providing that the moon and celestial bodies
shall be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes. '55
The view of the non-aligned countries in the United Nations is
that the use of a given environment for peaceful purposes necessarily
excludes all military activities whatever their purpose, and that there
is no reason to depart from this interpretation with respect to the
1971 Seabed Treaty.56 The Soviet Union also equates "peaceful pur-
poses" with "non-military purposes," and applies the same line of
reasoning to the 1971 Seabed Treaty.5 7
Yet, signatories to the 1971 Seabed Treaty could arguably util-
ize the high seas for military purposes without violating the Treaty's
provisions. Numerous ambiguities in the text could allow states to
circumvent the Treaty's "peaceful purposes" requirement. One area
of ambiguity involves the question of whether the Treaty prohibits
the emplacement of all nuclear devices on the seabed. For example,
Article I extends the weaponry ban only to "nuclear weapons or any
other types of weapons of mass destruction." 58 It also prohibits
"structures, installations or any other facilities designed for storing
testing or using such weapons" (Le., nuclear weapons or other weap-
ons of mass destruction).59 While the Treaty does not define either
the term "nuclear weapons" or the term "weapons of mass destruc-
tion," the early U.S. opposition to the Soviet proposal for complete
demilitarization of the seabed and ocean floor60 would indicate that
53. Id art. IV.
54. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 49, at art. I.
55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. IV. (emphasis added).
56. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1969/70, supra note 19, at 157.
57. Id at 157-58.
58. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. I.
59. Id (emphasis added).
60. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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weapons falling outside these two categories were not intended to be
covered by the ban.
From a purely logical perspective, moreover, Article I of the
1971 Seabed Treaty refers only to nuclear weapons and not to all
nuclear devices generally. Arguably, if it can be shown that a partic-
ular nuclear device is not a weapon; or if that device is shown to
involve non-weapon applications of nuclear energy, it would not be
covered by the ban.61 Similarly, the absence of a definition of a
nuclear weapon makes it unclear whether, from a purely textual
point of view, the 1971 Seabed Treaty must be deemed to have also
prohibited the peaceful application of nuclear energy in such areas
as seabed transport, or with respect to mining, drilling or blasting on
the seabed for purely commercial reasons.6 2
Unfortunately, none of the draft seabed treaties that the U.S. or
the U.S.S.R. forwarded before or after the 1971 Seabed Treaty deal
directly with this question. The Soviet draft articles of a treaty on
the use of the seabed for peaceful purposes submitted in July 1971,63
provided that "[t]he use of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof for
military purposes shall be prohibited."' The draft articles did not
define "military purposes"; nor did they make any reference to non-
weapon applications of nuclear energy under water. Similarly, a
U.S.-sponsored draft convention on the international seabed area 65
submitted in 1970 provided that the "International Seabed Area
61. See E. Brown, supra note 18, at 202. Mr. Brown suggests that an exemplificative
list of mass-destruction systems should supplement the Treaty's provisions in order to
better illustrate the scope of its prohibition. To compile such a list, he suggests drafters
should look to the character and capacity of a weapons system as well as its purpose. Id
62. It may be noted that the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) defines a "nuclear weapon" as "any device
which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a
group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument
that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this
definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof." Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, done Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281, 332.
The U.S. contends that only weapons of mass destruction could have enough military
significance to warrant the expense of stationing them on the seabed. SIPRI YEARBOOK
1969/70,supra note 19, at 158. The U.S. also asserts that conventional military use of the
seabed is not likely to threaten the territories of states either now or in the near future.
Id If this is the case, the U.S. should not have objected to including conventional weap-
ons in the ban. (See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text). As most members of the
Disarmament Committee felt, by specifically prohibiting only nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction, the 1971 Seabed Treaty may give the impression that it
condones the use of conventional weapons on the seabed. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1969/70,
supra note 19, at 159.
63. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/43 (submitted to the U.N. Seabed Committee July 22,
1971).
64. Id art. 1.
65. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/25 (submitted to the U.N. Seabed Committee August 3,
1970).
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shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. ' 66 The draft
failed to define the term "peaceful purposes," and made no mention
of non-weapon applications of nuclear energy.
Several other ambiguities in the 1971 Seabed Treaty render its
effectiveness with respect to demilitarization uncertain. For exam-
ple, Article I provides that "States Parties to this Treaty undertake
not to emplant to emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil thereof. . . any nuclear weapons or any other types of
weapons of mass destruction . *..67 While the difference between
"emplant" and "emplace" is not explained anywhere in the Treaty,
references to the "seabed," the "ocean floor," and its "subsoil"
appear to refer to fixed installations and to exclude from the ban
submarines equipped with conventional or nuclear weapons, either
while riding at anchor or while lying on the seabed.68
Vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction that are capable
of navigating when they are in contact with the seabed-"on-the-
bottom slowly-mobile mines"-also arguably are excluded from the
Treaty's ban. 69 Such vehicles, known as "creepy-crawlies," 70 seem to
escape the ban by virtue of the fact that they are mobile and not
fixed to the seabed, ocean floor, or its subsoil.7 1 Such vehicles need
not, however, be mobile all the time and may rest on the seabed for
indefinite periods of time. The fact that they are capable of naviga-
tion independently of the seabed would arguably exclude such vehi-
cles from the Treaty's ban.
The clause in the 1971 Seabed Treaty on structures and installa-
tions "specifically designed for storing, testing or using" 72 weapons
of mass destruction also permits potential military use of the seabed.
66. Id art. I.
67. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. I.
68. See Joyner, Towards a Legal Regime/or the International Seabed- The Soviet
Union's Evolving Perspective, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 871, 884 (1975). See also Barry, supra
note 27, at 583. The U.S. delegate to the Disarmament Committee himself confirmed the
view that the Treaty does not exclude submarines:
[Vehicles which can navigate in the water above the sea-bed and submarines
should be viewed in the same way as any other ships; submarines would there-
fore not be violating the treaty if they were either anchored to, or resting on, the
sea-bed.
U.N. Doc. CCD/PV. 440 (1970).
Perhaps one reason for the exclusion of submarines from the ban is that their deploy-
ment already provides a rough and ready peace-through-mutual-deterrence guarantee
with which nations should not tamper.
69. See Barry, supra note 27, at 583. The U.S. has argued that limiting such vehicles
would infringe upon a nation's freedom of navigation. See infra note 7 1.
70. ARMs CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE, supra note 14, at 58.
71. See G. Smith, Ambassador Smith Presents U.S. Views on Seabed Proposal at
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, 60 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 333, 337 (April 21,
1969).
72. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. I.
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Whether or not a particular structure is included in the ban will
arguably depend on its design and not on its purpose. It is possible
that a vehicle may be designed for something other than the delivery
of weapons of mass destruction, and yet be capable of delivering
such weapons. If original design is retained as the sole criterion such
vehicles would also escape the ban. If the ban is limited to those
vehicles or structures that are fixed to the seabed, even surface-based
nuclear missile systems may be permissible under the Treaty.73
Finally, the 1971 Seabed Treaty does not discuss what limita-
tions, if any, exist with respect to military use of the zones immedi-
ately surrounding a state's territory. Article II of the Treaty provides
that the outer limit of the prohibited zone "shall be coterminous with
the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in Part II of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. .... -74
The Treaty thus leaves coastal states free to emplace or to invite
allies to emplace weapons of mass destruction within their twelve-
mile coastal zones.75
In view of the leeway which the 1971 Seabed Treaty affords its
signatories with respect to military use of the seas, its use of the term
"peaceful purposes" cannot mean "non-military purposes," however
unpalatable this may be to those genuinely concerned with excluding
the oceans from the arms race. The preamble in fact declares that
the Treaty is only "a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race."' 76 Similarly,
under Article V the parties recognize the need for further negotia-
tions to save the oceans from the arms race, and pledge their willing-
ness to negotiate in good faith toward this goal.7 7
2. "Peaceful Purposes" in Light of the Traditional Uses of
the High Seas
Use of the term "peaceful purposes" in the 1971 Seabed Treaty
may not necessarily mean "non-military purposes"; indeed, one of
the traditional uses of the high seas recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law is the right of states to employ the seas for
73. For example, research in the U.S. with respect to projects such as the SABMIS
(Sea-based Antiballistic Missile Intercept System) and the BMS (Ballistic Missile Ship
System) would be permissible under the Treaty.
74. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. II. See supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
75. See Barry, supra note 27, at 583. Mr. Barry believes that this provision represents
the Treaty's greatest deficiency. "[I]t leaves the thousands of square miles of ocean floor
between the coast and the 12-mile limit free of any restriction whatsoever." Id
76. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at preamble.
77. Id art. V.
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military purposes.78 For example, military vessels are allowed to
traverse the waters of the high seas under the principle of the free-
dom of navigation.79 Major powers have conducted military maneu-
vers, target practice and electronic reconnaissance on specific
portions of the high seas, often closing off these portions to other
states.80
General international law-with regard to military activities on
the surface of the high seas-requires only that states conducting
such activities show "reasonable regard" for the interests of others in
the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed to them.8'
This standard of reasonableness was incorporated in Article 2 of
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958 High Seas
Convention). Article 2 governs a state's use of waters beyond its ter-
ritorial sea. It provides in part:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exer-
cised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by other rules of
international law. It comprises, inter alia.
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedoms of the high
seas.
82
78. Zedalis, Military Uses of Ocean Space andthe Developing International Law ofthe
Sex" An Analysis in the Context of Peacetime ASW, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 575, 607
(1979).
79. Id
80. Id at 608. See also Lissitzyn, Electronic Reconnaissancefrom the High Seas and
International Law, 61 INT'L LAW STUD. 563, 566-68 (1980).
A proposal by the Soviet Union, supported by Albania and Bulgaria, to prevent such
activities was defeated at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in
1958. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.32 (1958); U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.40
(1958). Due to lack of support, another Soviet-led proposal at the same conference to
prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas was never put to a vote. U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.32 (1958). Instead, the member states adopted a proposal put
forward by the United Kingdom to the effect that states should be free to use the high
seas so long as they have reasonable regard for the interests of other states. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.68 (1958). For a discussion of the appropriateness of atomic
weapon tests in the sea, see Rao, Legal Regulation of Maritime Military Uses, 13 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 425, 435-36 (1973).
81. See Zedalis, "Peaceful Purposes" and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised
Composite Negotiating Text: A Comparative Analysis of the Existing and the Proposed
Military Regimefor the High Seas, 7 SYRAC. J. INr'L L. & COMM. 1, 16 (1979). See also
M. McDougal & W. Burke, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 773, n.2 (1962).
82. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as
1958 High Seas Convention].
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In view of the 1958 High Seas Convention, and in the absence
of a clear legal prohibition to the contrary, it would be legitimate
and reasonable to apply the same legal principle to activity below
the surface as to activity on the surface. In other words, military
activity conducted below the surface of the sea should be permissible
so long as states' freedoms are exercised with adequate regard for the
interests of other states. In that event, the term "peaceful purposes"
in the 1971 Seabed Treaty may be interpreted to mean "non-
aggressive."
The view that the use of the high seas for at least some military
activity is not inconsistent with international law was impliedly
endorsed by the recent Draft Convention of the Ninth Session of
UNCLOS 111.83 Significantly, the Draft Convention, like the 1971
Seabed Treaty, incorporates a "peaceful purposes" clause.84
If all of the draft articles are read together, it becomes clear that
the use of the term "peaceful purposes" does not mean, and was not
intended to mean, "non-military" purposes. One of the freedoms
guaranteed to all states under the draft articles is the freedom of nav-
igation. 5 This freedom is not restricted in any way; indeed, the draft
articles state that "[w]arships on the highseas have complete immu-
nity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State."8a6
This clearly envisages a military use of the high seas. Further,
because foreign warships often reach the territorial sea of a coastal
state by traversing a portion of the high seas, the draft articles must
contemplate some use of the high seas by military vessels.87
The new Draft Convention does not in any way purport to
restrict the traditional freedom of navigation which Article 2 of the
1958 High Seas Convention guarantees.88 Furthermore, although
the new articles do substitute a standard of "due consideration" for
"reasonable regard"8 9 for the interests of other states,90 it is arguable
that the substitution does not change the standard of reasonableness
established under the 1958 High Seas Convention. 91 The fact that
the Draft Convention of UNCLOS III is the latest pronouncement
by the entire international community at a conference devoted spe-
83. Draft Convention, supra note 46.
84. Id art. 88. The article simply states "[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peace-
ful purposes."
85. Id art. 87(l)(a).
86. Id art. 95.
87. See Zedalis, supra note 78, at 614, n.173.
88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
89. Id States may exercise their freedoms "with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States." 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 82, at art. 2.
90. See Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 87(2).
91. See Zedalis, supra note 78, at 615. Mr. Zedalis argues that the new articles per-
mit all military activities so long as they are not aggressive. Id
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cifically and exclusively to the law of the sea renders its endorsement
of the use of the high seas for at least some military activity particu-
larly relevant.
3. The Permissible Range of Peaceful Underwater Activity Under
the 1971 Seabed Treaty and UNCLOS III
Assuming that the term "peaceful purposes" in the 1971 Seabed
Treaty has the same meaning as does the term in the Draft Conven-
tion of UNCLOS III, then such underwater activity in the high seas
as peacetime deployment of acoustic detection devices and maneu-
vers to practice anti-submarine warfare (ASW) should be permissi-
ble-subject to the proviso that these activities do not unreasonably
interfere with the interests of other states,92 and do not appropriate
the high seas to the exclusive sovereignty of any one state.93
A total military ban such as that advocated by the Soviet
Union94 would prohibit much of such underwater activity, and thus,
arguably, would thwart a coastal state's ability to protect itself. A
total ban would disallow such defensive uses as the deployment of
submarine detection and surveillance devices-activities of crucial
importance to both superpowers. 95 In view of the technological sim-
ilarities between detection and surveillance devices that are used in
both military and non-military activities, a blanket ban could also
hinder scientific research that would be of great benefit with respect
to non-military uses of the oceans.96
92. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 87. Article 87 protects freedoms of the
seas similar to those protected by Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention. See supra
note 82 and accompanying text.
93. Id art. 89. Article 89 provides "[n]o state may validly purport to subject any part
of the high seas to its sovereignty."
94. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
Favoring a total ban has propogandistic value for the Soviets. One commentator made
the following observation with respect to Soviet attitudes and tactics on disarmament:
"The current Soviet approach seems to be to negotiate seriously for militarily valuable
limited measures of arms control while at the same time mounting a propaganda assault
with intentionally unnegotiable proposals mainly in relation to general and complete
disarmament." E. Brown, supra note 18, at 203, n.64. See also Barry, supra note 27, at
576-77.
95. Of particular concern to coastal states such as the U.S. was the fact that the
Soviet proposals would have prohibited the construction of radar towers and other
"purely passive defensive devices" such as sonars for purposes of observing and record-
ing the movement of submarines:
mhe existence of submarine forces requires States to take action in self-defense,
such as establishing warning systems that use the sea-bed .... The United
States is not prepared to enter into a treaty which would throw the propriety of
these systems in doubt.
Statement of U.S. delegate before the ENDC, U.N. Doe. ENDC/PV.41 (1967).
96. One way to reduce suspicion over civilian research is to internationalize it as
much as possible by allowing free participation and the free sharing of the results of such
research by all states. The Draft Convention established a framework for an interna-
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As the eventual co-sponsors of the 1971 Seabed Treaty, the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. did appear to be aware of the related nature of the
two types of research. Representatives of each nation unofficially
explained that while the banned facilities did not include those for
research or commercial exploitation not specifically designed for
storing, testing or using weapons of mass destruction, facilities spe-
cifically designed for using such weapons would not be exempted on
the ground that they could also use conventional weapons. 97 They
also explained that the ban did not extend to the conduct of peaceful
nuclear explosions or applications of nuclear reactors, scientific
research or other non-weapon applications of nuclear energy. 9 But
bottom-crawling submersibles which could navigate only when in
contact with the seabed, and which were specifically designed to use
nuclear weapons, would be included in the ban.99 None of this was
written into the text of the final treaty, however.
Most coastal states do appear to support the installation of
"purely passive defensive" listening devices only for purposes of self-
defense. 100 Coastal states should be permitted to locate such devices,
but only in areas close to their coast lines. Under the regime of
UNCLOS III a twenty-four-mile contiguous zone' 0 1 is created in
contrast to the twelve-mile contiguous zone of the 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention. 10 2 Further, the twenty-four-mile contiguous zone is
made part of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, wherein the
coastal state enjoys certain exclusive economic rights. 0 3 However,
tional scheme to conduct scientific research and to share results of the research. Draft
Convention, supra note 46 at arts. 143-44, 148.
97. U.N. Doc. CCD/PV.440 (1969).
98. Id
99. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1969/70, supra note 19, at 160-61.
100. E. Young, Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ocean, in PACEM IN MARIBUS,
supra note 6, at 280. See also statement of the Canadian delegate at the Disarmament
Conference, U.N. Doc. ENDC/PV.410 (1969). A Swedish proposal in the ENDC to
exclude only such defensive devices from an otherwise comprehensive military ban
received wide support. U.N. Doc. ENDC/PV.422 (1969). This proposal is sensible since
it would provide reasonable security for coastal areas from surprise enemy submarine
movements, and at the same time it would ensure that such "passive" devices could not
be used for offensive purposes.
101. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 33, para. 2.
102. *See supra note 26. The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention's preference for a 12-
mile zone was incorporated into the 1971 Seabed Treaty. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note
36, at art. II.
103. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at arts. 56, 57. The economic rights include
rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage natural resources of the seabed and sub-
soil, as well as rights to produce energy from the water or currents of adjacent areas. Id
art. 56. See also Zedalis, supra note 78, at 625-29, 647. Mr. Zedalis argues that if foreign
state activity (particularly ASW deployment programs) within a coastal state's contigu-
ous or economic zone is threatening enough, then the coastal state may invoke its inher-
ent right of self defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and take
appropriate remedial measures.
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foreign warships and military vessels continue to enjoy the tradi-
tional freedoms of navigation within these two zones (including the
freedom to deploy "passive" or defensive underwater detection
devices), subject to "due consideration" or reasonable regard for the
rights of other states.
In effect, UNCLOS III extends a coastal state's contiguous zone
by twelve miles and recognizes its exclusive economic zone for up to
200 miles, but does not prevent other states from navigating military
vessels within either of the two zones. The 1971 Seabed Treaty does
not address other states' freedoms of navigation, but presumably
adheres to the "reasonable regard" formula of the 1958 High Seas
Convention. The peaceable range of underwater activity is none too
clear under either document.
4. The Princile of "Common Interests" and "Peaceful Uses" of
the Seabed Under UNCLOS III
One may argue that the Draft Convention of UNCLOS III dis-
tinuishes between the surface of the sea and the seabed, proscribing
some military activity on the sea surface and all military activity on
the seabed. While Article 88 of the Draft Convention provides that
the high seas shall be reserved for "peaceful purposes," Article 141
provides that the "Area" (i e., the seabed) shall be used "exclusively
for peaceful purposes."'104 Since the seabed thereby is given separate
treatment, and activities thereon are to be "exclusively" for peaceful
purposes, it may be argued that the drafters intended something
more than the usual prohibition for activities on the seabed. Fur-
ther, under the Draft Convention all activities in the "Area" are to
be "carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole." 0 5 Thus, any
activity in the Area that is of exclusive military benefit to a state or a
group of states, because it does not benefit mankind as a whole,
would arguably be prohibited under this approach.
Such arguments are easily disputed. At the outset, it may be
observed that the use of the adverb "exclusively" cannot by itself
bring about a qualitative change in the use of a thing that is tradi-
tionally reserved for "peaceful purposes." Further, the phrase
"exclusively for peaceful purposes" has been discussed in the various
fora of the United Nations ever since the emergence of nuclear
weapons following World War 11.106 The major maritime powers
have consistently maintained that the term does not prohibit all mil-
104. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 141 (emphasis added).
105. Id art. 140.
106. Rao, supra note 80, at 450; SIPRI YEARBooK 1969/70, supra note 19, at 160-61.
See also supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
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tary uses. 107
In any case, if the term "exclusively for peaceful purposes" is
considered within the context of the general wording of Article 141
of the Draft Convention, and if one considers Article 141 within the
context of the Draft Convention as a whole, it becomes clear that the
term could not have been intended to proscribe all military activity
on the seabed. This is true regardless of whether the activity in ques-
tion is consistent with the "common heritage of mankind" concept
inherent in the Draft Convention.
Looking first at the wording of Article 141, as well as the gen-
eral context of Part XI in which it appears, it should be noted that
Part XI is concerned exclusively with the establishment of a regime
governing the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
Area. The word "activities" throughout Part XI refers only to activi-
ties in relation to resources, not in relation to military activities.'08 It
thus appears that military activities on the seabed were not intended
to be included in the term "activities in the Area."
Additional confirmation of this view is found in the common
heritage concept articulated in Part XI. This Part provides that
"it]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of man-
kind,"' 0 9 and that "[aIll' rights in the resources of the Area are vested
in mankind as a whole."" 0 The common heritage concept is used
exclusively in reference to the resources of the Area. Similarly, Part
XI provides that "[n]o State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, . . ."I I
This proscription against sovereignty likewise appears to be designed
to apply only to the Area's resources." 12 In sum, the common heri-
tage principle read together with the prohibition against alienation
107. The United States has maintained that the term does not automatically restrict
military use of the sea unless restrictions are negotiated and.embodied in specific agree-
ments. See U.N. Doe. A/C.I/PV.1590 (1967). See also supra text accompanying note
27. For the Soviet view, see U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1592 (1967). See also supra text
accompanying notes 24-25, 57.
108. Article 134 of the Draft Convention defines the scope of Part XI, which is the
Part in which Article 141 appears. It provides that "[a]ctivities in the Area shall be gov-
erned by the provisions of this Part." Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 134, para.
5.
It may be recalled that the Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the Eighth Session
of UNCLOS III provided in its corresponding definitional article, Article 133(a), that
"activities in the Area" meant "all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the
resources of the Area." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.l0/Rev.I (1979).
109. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 136.
110. Id art. 137, para. 2.
111. Id art. 137, para. 1.
112. Article 137(1) does apply to the "Area" as well. The significance of the latter
provision is that military activity which permanently appropriates any part of the Area to
exclusive use would be covered by the ban, whereas the ban would not cover other mili-
tary activities.
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and sovereign appropriation is aimed at making the resources of the
Area available to all states without discrimination.' 13 Part XI and
Article 141 are not aimed at prohibiting "passive defensive" military
activity such as the deployment of detection, surveillance and ASW
devices not permanently fixed to the seabed. 14
Further interpretive guidance for Article 141 is found in other
relevant provisions of the Draft Convention. Of particular interest is
the article concerning the settlement of disputes. It provides in part:
1. Without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, a State
Party when signing, ratifying or otherwise expressing its consent to be bound
by this Convention, or at any time thereafter, may declare that it does not
accept any one or more of the procedures for the settlement of disputes speci-
fied in ... [the Convention] with respect to one or more of the following
categories of disputes:
(b) Disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by
government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and dis-
putes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sov-
ereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal under Artcle 297 paragraphs 2 and 3.115
This provision may be construed as a continuing reminder that
the great powers have regarded military activity as an important
maritime activity which they have consistently sought to protect
throughout the history of the law-of-the-sea debate." 6 Thus viewed,
such a clause is of obvious advantage to the naval powers. One
could also view the provisions as being in the interest of all coastal
states, big and small, because they may feel free to regulate, restrict
or even prohibit military activity in waters within their jurisdiction
without fear of being called to account before any tribunal having
compulsory jurisdiction." 7  The irony, however, is obvious: by
removing military activities from compulsory dispute settlement pro-
113. Article 141 specifically provides: "The Area shall be open to use exclusively for
peaceful purposes by all States, whether coastal or land-locked, without discrimination
and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part." Id art. 141.
114. See N. Javis, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 85 (1976). Cf. Zedalis, supra
note 78, at 662. In the words of one commentator
[A]ny contention that detection devices installed on the sea floor and designed to
conduct surveillance of the ocean 'space' come within the ambit of the 'benefit of
mankind' provision by virtue of consituting exploration of a resource is incorrect.
Not only is it highly unlikely that mere observation constitutes 'exploration,' but
[the Draft Convention] specifically restrict[s] the application of the provision to
the seabed and subsoil and define[s] resources to mean mineral resources, not
resources as metaphysical as space.
Id at 657 (footnotes omitted).
115. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 298.
116. McDougal & Burke, supra note 81, at 754-55.
117. Janis, Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention: The Military Activities
Exception,.4 OcEAN Dnv. & INT'L L. 51, 52-54 (1977). See also Bernhardt, Compulsory
Dispute Settlement in the Law ofthe Sea Negotiations .4 Reassessment, 19 VA. J. INT'L L.
69, 98-99 (1978).
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cedures, the Draft Convention removes the one activity that most
needs a peaceful resolution.
Regardless of the merits of such a provision, its very existence as
well as the implications it holds for military activity on the surface of
the high seas and the deep seabed, the existence of other provisions
in the Draft Convention which contemplate at least some military
activity on the high seas, the general concern of Part XI with
resources of the area and, finally, the applicability of the common
heritage concept to those resources all militate against the conclusion
that Article 141 of the Draft Convention prohibits all military activ-
ity on the seabed. The effect of the term "peaceful purposes" in both
the 1971 Seabed Treaty and in the Draft Convention of UNCLOS
III does not prohibit military use of the seabed or of the high seas.
The only proscription is against "unreasonable" military activity
that infringes upon other states' exercise of their maritime freedoms.
D. THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION UNDER THE
1971 SEABED TREATY
While the two superpowers that sponsored the 1971 Seabed
Treaty currently enjoy a technological monopoly over the emplace-
ment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on
the seafloor, 118 the question of verification and enforcement of the
ban is one that generally concerns all signatories to the Treaty, and
particularly concerns the coastal states. By signing the 1971 Seabed
Treaty these states agreed to refrain from activities they lacked the
technology to undertake in the first place, as well as to refrain from
activities which their national interests did not favor. But verifica-
tion has become a question of vital national interest for all parties to
the Treaty, because the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction
on the seabed by any state touches the national security of all states,
developed or less-developed, coastal or inland. Verification by the
majority of the signatories, however, would be impossible without
assistance from certain technologically advanced states."19 Unfortu-
nately, those same states happen to be the states most likely to
emplace the prohibited weapons. Verification could therefore
become a bipolar issue-with all the attendant dangers of an East
versus West rivalry.
118. W. Burke, OCEAN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL
LAw OF THE SEAS 10-39 (1965). See also Barry, supra note 27, at 572; SIPRI YEARBOOK
1969/70, supra note 19, at 168.
119. The majority of the signatories to the 1971 Seabed Treaty possess little, if any,
underseas technology. See ARMS CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE, supra note 14, at 85-88.
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Article III of the 1971 Seabed Treaty provides that if a party has
doubts about the activities of any other party "the State Party having
such doubts shall notify the other State Parties, and the Parties con-
cerned shall cooperate on such further procedures for verification as
may be agreed. .... ,,120 A state may conduct verification by
"using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any
other State Party. .... "z121 Because only the two major powers pos-
sess the technology for meaningful verification, and since only these
two powers claim to perceive the sort of worldwide interests which
might lead to the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on
the seabed, the process of consultation envisaged by Article III is
reduced to consultation between a less-developed party and one
superpower in opposition to the other superpower. Even the ulti-
mate right of appeal to the Security Council 2 2 may prove ineffective
considering that all five nuclear powers hold rights to veto its
action. 23
The Treaty's provisions with respect to verification leave many
questions unanswered, and fail to provide a means of resolving areas
of potential conflict or disagreement. For example, attempts at ver-
ification could easily lead to charges of "interference" with legiti-
mate national activity. 24 Article III provides that a state's seabed
activities may be observed "provided that observation does not inter-
fere with such activities."' 2 5 Article III also provides that verifica-
tion "shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and
shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under inter-
national law, including the freedoms of the high seas. .... 1126 Such
120. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. III, para. 2.
121. Id art. III, para. 5.
122. Article III provides that a State Party may, where there remains "a serious ques-
tion concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty," refer the mat-
ter to the Security Council. Id art. II, para. 4.
123. The U.N. Charter provides that a "decision" (ie., action) of the Security Council
requires "an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes oftheperma-
nent members," the latter being the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom,
France and China. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. (emphasis added). The failure of
any of the five permanent members to vote in favor of a given proposal would automati-
cally "veto" the action.
124. ARMs CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE, supra note 14, at 85-86.
125. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. III, para. 4.
126. Id art. III, para. 6.
The provision that verification must not interfere with the freedoms of the high seas
could create further difficulties now that many states have claimed exclusive economic
zones of 200 miles. The Treaty does not address whether observation outside the 12-mile
zone but inside the 200-mile area is permissible, or whether this ought to be treated as
"interference" with sovereign jurisdiction. Nor does the Treaty address whether objec-
tions from a coastal state to verification attempts within its 200-mile zone ought to be
regarded as an infringement of the freedoms of the high seas set forth in paragraph six of
Article III.
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escape clauses could provide very convenient protective shields insu-
lating dubious state activity from international scrutiny. The Treaty
does not indicate how interference charges are to be dealt with, nor
does it indicate the effects of such a charge if it is substantiated.
Another potential source of conflict concerns the effect of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 127 on verification
activities. The Convention allows coastal states to establish safety
zones of up to 500 meters around installations for the exploitation of
natural resources on the seabed; safety zones which ships of all
nationalities must respect.128 If a state suspected of violating the
Treaty declares the installation in question to be such a facility, it
may be able to prevent direct access to it by other states seeking ver-
ification. In that event, other states may "look at" but may not "look
into" the facility.
The U.S. has argued that a blanket right to look into underseas
facilities is unnecessary in light of the principle of the freedoms of
the high seas; a principle which permits parties to approach an area
of a suspected underseas facility and study surface and underwater
engineering activity, surface support platforms for the facility, and
the types of equipment and material thereon. 129 Because emplace-
ments of mass destruction weapons would require sophisticated
material and equipment, special engineering facilities on the surface
and other "tell-tale" signs, a direct look into the installation in ques-
tion would arguably be unnecessary. 30 Whether direct access to
underwater facilities for purposes of verification is necessary, unnec-
essary or even permissible under the Treaty is another area it does
not address.
Although there may be substantial difficulties under the scheme
of verification envisaged by the 1971 Seabed Treaty, verification by
itself is not the major problem in any treaty limiting armaments.
The real problem is whether the parties are willing to accept the obli-
gations imposed by an arms control agreement. Nonetheless, the
uncertainty of the verification provisions may cause more problems
than the provisions resolve.
E. THE 1971 SEABED TREATY AND COASTAL MARITIME ZONES
Finally, the 1971 Seabed Treaty skirts the issue of demilitariza-
tion (even in the limited sense of prohibiting weapons of mass
127. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf
Convention].
128. Id at art. 5, para. 3.




destruction) of the maritime zones that fall under the traditional
scheme of national waters, including the territorial sea, the contigu-
ous zone and the continental shelf.
Customary international law dictates that national waters (l e.,
those maritime zones landward of the baseline of the territorial sea)
are under the complete sovereignty of coastal states.' 3' The 1971
Seabed Treaty does not attempt to alter this arrangement by cur-
tailing state sovereignty in such zones. As with many of its other
provisions, however, restrictions on activities in the coastal zones
may be derived from sources other than the Treaty. For example, a
state's absolute sovereignty over national waters, while untouched by
the 1971 Seabed Treaty, may be restricted by the 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention with respect to other states' rights of free passage in
internal waters.' 32 A state's absolute sovereignty over its national
waters may also be restricted by the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
1963,133 which obliges each party to refrain from carrying out
nuclear test explosions "at any place under its jurisdiction or control
. . . including territorial waters. ' ' 34
The 1971 Seabed Treaty is similarly silent with respect to demil-
itarization of a state's territorial sea. Article II of the Treaty leaves
coastal states free to emplace weapons of mass destruction within the
twelve-mile coastal zones of their territorial seas. The 1958 Territo-
rial Sea Convention provides, however, that "ships of all States
whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea.' 35 Passage is innocent so long as it is not
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
state." 136
Submarines, warships and other foreign military vessels would
presumably enjoy a right of innocent passage, subject to the power of
the coastal state "to suspend temporarily in specified areas of its ter-
ritorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is
essential for the protection of its security."'137 There can, however,
be no such suspension when states use a territorial sea strait for
131. McDougal & Burke, supra note 81, at 64.
132. Article 5(2) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention provides in part:
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 has
the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been consid-
ered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage,
as provided in Articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.
1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 28, at art. 5, para. 2.
133. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 37.
134. Id art. I, para. l(a).
135. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 28, at art. 14, para. 1.
136. Id art. 14, para. 5.
137. Id art. 16, para. 3. Under Article 14(6), submarines must navigate on the surface
and must show their flags. The articles of the Draft Convention of UNCLOS III go
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international navigation. 138
None of the above-mentioned restrictions on the rights of states
over their national and territorial waters are strong enough to imply
a ban on the emplacement of nuclear and mass destruction weapons
in those zones. 139 As for those provisions guaranteeing innocent pas-
sage, it may be possible to locate weapons systems on the territorial
seabed in such a way that they do not interfere with innocent pas-
sage, which, after all, is allowed only on the surface. Moreover,
according to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, a state's obligation
to allow innocent passage is limited within the as-yet-undefined
outer limit of the territorial sea; the obligation does not extend over
the entire twelve-mile contiguous zone referred to in Part II of the
Convention. 14
The 1971 Seabed Treaty is equally unsatisfactory with respect to
the demilitarization of the continental shelf. Under the 1958 Geneva
beyond Article 14(6) and enumerate specific activities that are per se prejudicial. Draft
Convention, supra note 46, art. 19, para. 2.
138. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 28, at art. 14, para. 6. The provisions
of Article 14(6) regarding submarines also would seem to apply to navigation through
international straits forming part of the territorial sea. Such restrictions led the U.S. to
demand the right of "free transit" rather than just "innocent passage" through interna-
tional straits. In return, at the Geneva Conferences of 1959 and 1960 the U.S. indicated
that it would drop its insistence on a narrow territorial sea of three miles and accept a
wider limit of 12 miles. The development of Soviet naval strength and its fishing and
merchant marine fleets led the U.S.S.R. to support the U.S. position on narrow territorial
seas and free transit through straits. See generally McDougal & Burke, supra note 81, at
501, 504; Sulikowski, Soviet Ocean Policy, 3 OcEaN Dnv. & INT'L L. 70-71 (1975).
139. Nor do the draft articles of UNCLOS III purport to change materially the
existing regime of sovereignty; they continue to acknowledge coastal state sovereignty
over national waters and the territorial sea. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 2,
para. 2. A concomitant power is the power to exclude foreign military activity in the
subjacent seabed and subsoil of both zones.
140. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 28, at art. 24. The diagram below
illustrates the different zones and areas which the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention pro-
tects. As the diagram shows, there may be an "overlap" between a coastal state's contig-
uous zone and its continental shelf. In such an instance it is important to remember that
the rights of the coastal state in that portion of its continental shelf falling immediately
below its contiguous zone are different from those conferred to it by Article 24 of the
Convention.
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Convention on the Continental Shelf,14' the term "continental shelf"
refers "to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
meters .... -142 A coastal state may exercise sovereign rights over
the continental shelf "for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources." 143 Further, under the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention, the coastal state may exercise, in its contiguous zone,
rights "to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea," and to
"punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea.' ' 44
Not only does the 1971 Seabed Treaty not indicate whether such
distinctions are legally useful or relevant for purposes of determining
the areas in which a state may or may not emplace nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction, but in one broad sweep it
declares that the prohibited zone "shall be coterminous with the
twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in Part II of the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. .... ,145 In












141. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 127.
142. Id art. 1.
143. Id art. 2.
144. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 28, at art. 2.
145. 1971 Seabed Treaty, supra note 36, at art. II. See also note 38 and accompanying
text.
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doing so it conceivably allows the splitting up of continental shelves,
leaving the landward portions of these shelves (ie., those falling
immediately below the contiguous zones) exempt from the ban,
while including in the ban those portions of the shelves extending
beyond the contiguous zones.
The 1971 Seabed Treaty's definition of the prohibited zone has
two legal consequences: First, by juxtaposing two zones (the twelve-
mile coastal zone and the rest of the high seas), and by prohibiting
weapons of mass destruction in only the latter zone, the Treaty
creates a contrario an implied right to emplace such weapons in the
other (Ze., twelve-mile coastal) zone. Second, by allowing this inter-
pretation, the Treaty appears to lump the area of the contiguous
zone and that portion (if any) of the continental shelf falling imme-
diately below it with the territorial sea, thus creating an erroneous
impression that a coastal state has complete sovereignty over the
entire twelve-mile coastal zone and the seabed below it, rather than
just over the territorial sea. For, what better evidence of sovereignty
can be offered in respect of any given area, than a right, purportedly
derived from an international legal document, to emplace nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction there? Unless
meaningful international opposition to such claims is effectuated,
acquiescence may whet a state's appetite for more extensive claims
on the high seas. 146
It is evident that the 1971 Seabed Treaty contains numerous
flaws, omissions and inadequacies. Aside from the fact that its
"peaceful purposes" goal cannot mean non-military purposes,1 47 it
fails to address the real threat to peace in the oceans: mobile under-
water strategic forces. By banning nuclear installations on the sea-
bed the Treaty bans something that is no longer of great military
significance to the strategic deterrent forces of either the U.S. or the
U.S.S.R. While the existing deployment of underwater weapons sys-
tems (especially submarines) may be viewed as guaranteeing a cer-
tain peace and stability through mutual deterrence, more advanced
developments could upset this precarious balance in the future.1 48
An important factor in the popularity of underwater attack sys-
tems-and one which may encourage their further development in
ways which could threaten the existing balance-is their relative
invulnerability when compared with other surface-based systems on
146. This question is more thoroughly examined in the next section. See infra notes
153-57 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 56-62 & 67-77 and accompanying text.
148. See Zedalis, supra note 81, at 3.
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land, on the sea surface or on the seabed.149
Because the 1971 Seabed Treaty permits mobile underwater
weapons systems and the placement on the seabed of installations
servicing such systems, and because it fails to restrict the activities of
coastal states within their twelve-mile zones, it appears that the 1971
Seabed Treaty is not likely to contribute in any significant way to the
preservation of the ocean and the ocean environment from the arms
race.
F. NATIONAL APPROPRIATION OF INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SPACE:
THE DILEMMA OF THE FUTURE
One of the most urgent issues facing all those concerned with
the maintenance of peace and peaceful coexistence in the oceans is
the danger of national appropriation of international ocean space.
No international regime for peaceful exploitation of the economic
resources of the oceans currently exists, although progress appears to
have been made at the latest round of negotiations of UNCLOS
111.150 Both powers, however, remain committed to improving their
strategic deterrent forces. 151 Given these facts, and considering that
maximum invulnerability coupled with a "second strike" capability
is only assured underwater, the time is ripe for international lawyers
to consider whether states owning underwater weapons systems may
protect themselves by appropriating strategic areas of international
ocean space under their exclusive national jurisdictions. 152
States may find it difficult to resist making such claims if the
areas in question promise tangible economic gain. The economic
factor is bound to loom larger and acquire a new urgency in light of
the view that, within the next twenty years, most of the earth's land-
based resources and fossil fuel supplies will be exhausted. 53 Indi-
vidual nations will no doubt consider investing in serious long-term
economic exploitation of the oceans and, in the absence of effective
149. This invulnerability is due to (a) the mobility of underwater systems, (b) their
ability to hide by blending with the ocean environment, (c) their capacity for prolonged
submergence, and (d) the difficulty of detecting them because most existing detection
devices do not have detection range potentials commensurate with the ocean's vast area.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
150. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
151. See R. Morse, The Future fSea-basedDeterrence, in THE FuTURE OF THE SEA-
BASED DETERRENT 3, 5 (K. Tsipis, A. Calm, & B. Feld eds. 1973).
152. One authority fears that competition between submarine strategic systems and
efforts to locate and destroy them may lead to "an effort to assert exclusive jurisdiction
over the areas of the sea or to establish identification zones analogous to those now main-
tained in the air." L. Martin, THE SEA IN MODERN STRATEGY 34 (1967).
153. See Johnson & Logue, supra note 8, at 44-47. Messrs. Johnson and Logue indi-
cate that deep sea sources may compensate for the earth's dwindling supply of minerals
and fuels.
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international safeguards, probably will attempt to protect their
investments with military forces. If smaller states obtain access to
non-military underwater technology, they too may lay exclusive
claims to large tracts of international ocean space in order to protect
their own strategic systems from interference by commercial
undertakings.154
The U.S. view on states' interests in the ocean floor began crys-
tallizing as early as 1967:
In the near future, naval warfare may be extended to the sea-bed, as nations
intensify their competition for resources and strategic positions on the ocean
floor. These vast areas beyond the Continental Shelves are now, by Interna-
tional Law, accessible to any nation with the technology to establish and
maintain sovereignty over its sea-bed.155
While this statement does not amount to an official declaration
of intent to unilaterally appropriate those parts of the seabed and
ocean floor of strategic value to the U.S., it does constitute a candid
admission, at the official level, that nations' interests in the oceans
are growing, that states are going to "compete" for access to the eco-
nomic resources of the seabed as well as for strategic positions
thereon, and that this competition could lead to war on the high seas
conducted from the seabed rather than on the sea surface.
Coupled with this prognosis is the view that international ocean
space is legally "accessible" to any nation possessing the technology
to establish and maintain sovereignty over its sea-bed. The U.S.
does not define this legal right of access; it could be construed to
refer to nothing more innocuous than the use of the ocean space for
peaceful trade or for civilian transport. The context and general
tenor of the statement suggest, however, that the U.S. views the sea-
bed as "accessible" on a national basis for economic and strategic
purposes. One could argue that one of the legal incidents of this
right of access is the right toprotect personnel, equipment and other
resources expended in pursuit of that right. This would necessarily
involve an extension of national sovereignty beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction into what is now regarded as international
154. See W. Nierenberg, Militarized Oceans, in UNLESS PEACE COMES 119, 119-20 (N.
Colder ed. 1968). The different commercial undertakings involved include fisheries,
mineral extraction, and ocean facilities for weather prediction and control. If these com-
mercial undertakings are of an exclusively national (as opposed to an international) char-
acter, they may exacerbate interstate rivalries and goad states into being more
protectionist in order to insulate their strategic and economic sea-borne programs from
the prying eyes of neighboring or rival states.
155. Interagency Committee on Oceanography, Pamphlet No. 24 at 1 (March 1966),
quotedin ARMS CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE, supra note 14, at 16. See also Stoever, The
"Race"for the Seabed The Right to Emplace Military Installations on the Deep Ocean
Floor, 4 INT'L LAW. 560, 563 (1970).
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ocean space. 156
The failure of the 1971 Seabed Treaty to restrict state activity on
the surface and in subjacent waters of coastal zones creates a danger-
ous precedent allowing states to emplace weapons of mass destruc-
tion in areas which are actually part of the high seas. 157 The
international community is not only aware of this possibility, but has
declared its opposition to it.158 The Draft Convention of UNCLOS
156. See 22 U.N. GAOR (15th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (1967).
The absence of independent Soviet sources on Soviet strategic doctrine, together with
the tight controls on the flow of official information on the subject, make it impossible to
reference directly Soviet thinking. Yet similarities in the world-wide security and eco-
nomic power positions of the two countries, as well as certain parallels in their respective
concepts of strategic parity, make the danger of Soviet appropriation of international
ocean space equally real.
157. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. According to the 1958-Territorial
Sea Convention, the term "high seas" includes "all parts of the sea that are not included
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." 1958 Territorial Sea Conven-
tion, supra note 28, at art. I. Under the regime established by UNCLOS III, "high seas"
would include the contiguous zone and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. See supra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
If states do attempt to emplace weapons of mass destruction in the high seas, there will
be no lack of private law analogies to provide a legal rationalization for claims to such
areas. Legal scholars have been busy for the past 30 years modifying private law doc-
trines such as "prescription," "occupation," "effective control," "implied international
recognition or acquiscence," and "historical consolidation of title" to justify exploitation
of the seabed. Seegeneraly, R. Jennings, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 26-28 (1963); Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 376 (1950); Briggs, Jurisdiction over the Sea Bed and Subsoil Beyond Territorial
Waters, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 338 (1951); G. Schwarzenberger, A MANUAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 125-33 (1967).
158. In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly issued a Declaration of Princoples Governing
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 7ereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). Paragraph 8 of the Declaration states that:
'[t]he area (ie., the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction) shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses, without prejudice to any measures which have been or may be agreed
upon in the context of international negotiations undertaken in the field of dis-
armament and which may be applicable to a broader area. One or more interna-
tional agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible in order to implement
effectively this principle and to constitute a step towards the exclusion of the sea-
bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race.
Id at 24.
Paragraph 2 of the Declaration provides that:
The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States or persons,
natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign
rights over any part thereof.
Id
In a comment on an earlier draft of the 1971 Seabed Treaty, the U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed stressed the need "to reserve the maximum possible area
of the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, and consequently to use a formulation which
would not convey the impression that coastal states are expected to emplace weapons
where prohibition is not contemplated by the terms of the proposed draft." Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22A) at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/7622/
Add. 1 (1969).
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III did attempt to restrict states' activities in coastal zones by
providing:
No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any state or natural or juridical person,
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or
sovereign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized.15 9
This provision, however, appears in Part XI of the Draft Con-
vention of UNCLOS III. Part XI apparently relates only to the
exploration and exploitation of the resources of the Area. 160 Conse-
quently, it could be argued that the provision does not unequivocally
prohibit the appropriation of the Area for military purposes.
II
PROBLEMS OF "PEACE" IN THE EVOLVING LAW
OF OUTER SPACE
A. INTRODUCTION
Part II focuses on the law of peace in outer space. Because the
development of weapons in outer space is motivated by the same
considerations of strategic deterrence as the development of sea-
based weapons, it is not surprising that there are remarkable similar-
ities between the U.N. treaty law on the subject of peace in the
oceans and in outer space. Similarly, the same inadequacies that
beset the 1971 Seabed Treaty and the Draft Convention of
UNCLOS III beset the treaties governing militarization of outer
space.
Just as the pertinent treaty law on the oceans does not require
complete demilitarization of the seabed or the high seas, the relevant
treaties on outer space law also permit the deployment of weapons in
near-earth space. 16' The beginning sections of this Part will discuss
the military potential of outer space, describe the kinds of space
weapons that could develop in the future and how these Weapons
might compare with land and sea-based weapons, and explore the
possibility of a large scale militarization of outer space in light of the
above conclusions. 162
Consquently, much the same kind of analysis used in the first
Part to examine the treaty law governing militarization of the sea
will be used to examine the treaty law governing militarization of
159. Draft Convention, supra note 46, at art. 137.
160. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 67-76 & 104-17 and accompanying text.
162. For a comparison of the military and economic potential of the oceans and outer
space, see nfira text accompanying notes 181-92; for a discussion of the advantages of a
combined sea- and space-based strike force, see infra text accompanying note 187.
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outer space. For example, as Part I did with respect to the law of the
seas, Part II will show that the proscription of nuclear weapons in
space -was achieved in a way that does not pose any significant set-
back to the strategic interests of the two superpowers. 163
The treaty law governing the oceans and outer space attempts to
reserve both areas for "peaceful purposes." Part I examined the
meaning of "peaceful purposes" with reference to state practice and
the context in which the term is used in particular treaties. l 6 A simi-
lar approach will be used in this Part to define the meaning of
"peaceful purpose" in outer space law. 65 Part II likewise examines
the meaning of "peaceful purpose" with respect to purely defensive
activities such as surveillance, detection 166 and verification 167 in the
context of outer space law. In addition, this Part will assess the
impact of the principle of man's "common heritage" on peaceful
activities in outer space.' 68
The final section presents overall conclusions on the present
state of the law of outer space and the oceans, projects future trends,
and suggests an agenda for reform of the existing legal regimes of the
high seas and outer space.
B. THE POLITICS OF OUTER SPACE: PERTINENT SOVIET AND
AMERICAN ATTITUDES
A remarkable combination of political developments and scien-
tific advances culminated in the beginnings of the space age at a time
in world history when the Cold War was at its peak. It is therefore
not surprising that, from the launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet
Union in October 1957, to the first manned landing on the moon by
the United States in July 1969, and the first unmanned landing on
the planet Mars by the United States in July 1977, both the Soviet
Union and the United States have sought to exploit their achieve-
ments for political gain. The political ramifications of outer space
exploration have colored the space activities of both powers.
For example, after its Sputnik I launching, the U.S.S.R.
embarked on a concerted worldwide publicity campaign asserting
that the launching proved the superiority of its political system *over
163. See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103 on "defensive" activity in the oceans,
and infra notes 234-36 on "defensive" activity in outer space.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 118-30 on verification under the 1971 Seabed
Treaty, and infra notes 207-14 and 233-40, on verification under the Outer Space Treaty
as well as verification of activities in space generally.
168. See infra notes 246-63 and accompanying text.
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that of the West, that its citizens could therefore expect greater bene-
fits under that system, and that the U.S.S.R. possessed scientific,
technological and military superiority over any other nation. 169 Just
five weeks prior to the launching, the Soviet Union announced that it
had successfully tested an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM).170 Sputnik I was designed to show that the U.S.S.R. also
possessed the rocket booster to launch an ICBM.' 7 1 The subsequent
launchings of Sputnik II and 111172 were used to emphasize that the
U.S.S.R. possessed an ICBM booster capable of carrying heavy pay-
loads (le., warheads) to any point on the globe, and that the
U.S.S.R. possessed a highly accurate guidance system that would
enable it to target its ICBM's with pinpoint accuracy. 73
The publicity that the Soviet Union has accorded its space effort
has been rigidly controlled and selective, however.' 74 For example,
the Soviet press typically announced only the puccessful Soviet space
experiments, and generally chose to disclose only those outer space
activities that were nonmilitary and of no intelligence value. Pres-
ent-day Soviet policies on the disclosure of activities in outer space
169. See Editorial, Leading on Earth and in Space, 9 INT'L AFF. 3, 4 (Moscow 1962).
170. A. Horelick, The Soviet Union and the Political Uses of Outer Space, in OUTER
SPACE IN WORLD POLITICS 43, 45, 56 (J. Goldsen ed. 1963).
171. Id at 52.
172. Sputnik I was soon followed by Sputnik II and III, both larger and heavier than
their precursor. Id at 52, 56. Sputnik II carried a dog in space and Sputnik III was large
enough to accommodate a man. These satellites were injected into orbit with a high
degree of precision at pre-determined altitudes.
173. Id. at 53. Ironically, it was at a U.N. General Assembly debate on disarmament
that Khrushchev publicly announced that the U.S.S.R. was engaged in mass production
of ICBM's. He indicated that the Soviet Union was producing rockets "like sausages
from a sausage-machine." Statement by Khrushchev in the U.N. General Assembly,
Oct. 11, 1960. 15 U.N. GAOR (900th plen. mtg.) at 646 U.N.Doc. A/PV. 900 (1960).
In January 1959, the Soviet Union launched the first of a series of three rockets to the
moon, the second of which landed on the moon while the third photographed the far side
of the moon and televised pictures back to earth. See Zhukov, The Moon, Politics and
Law, 9 INT'L AFF. 32 (Moscow 1966). In 1961, the first manned space flights received
even greater publicity than had the unmanned flights. The Soviet press hailed the Soviet
cosmonauts as representatives of the "new Soviet man" and as "true sons of the Commu-
nist Party." Horelick, supra note 170, at 58.
Several of the Soviet achievements appear to have been timed to coincide with certain
politically significant events. For example, the landing of Lunik II on the moon occurred
just prior to Khrushchev's visit to the U.S., while the second Soviet-manned flight coin-
cided with the Warsaw Pact meeting of August 1961, when the decision to close the East
Berlin border was made. These events were punctuated by Soviet cosmonauts as well as
by Khrushchev himself publicly upholding the missile against any actual or potential
adversary. Such threats became less vociferous as the so-called "missile gap" between
the U.S.S.R. and the West became neutralized by parallel developments in the United
States. Horelick, supra note 170, at 58-59.
174. P. Kecskemeti, Outer Space and World Peace, in OUTER SPACE IN WORLD POLI-
TICS, supra note 170, at 25, 31. See also Horelick, supra note 170, at 59-60.
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remain similar. 175
The U.S. policy on disclosure, on the other hand, is less restric-
tive; public announcements are made of almost all experiments,
whether successful or not.176 Further, a publicly acknowledged sep-
aration between the civilian and military aspects of the American
space program 177 may be contrasted with the absence of any official
acceptance by the Soviet Union of such a separation in its space
program.178
Although the Soviet Union does publicize its military strength,
it stresses that any militarization is purely defensive, implying that it
is pointless to arm in preparation for war against the Soviet Union
because it has no aggressive intentions. Also implicit in the Soviet
approach is the warning that if it is attacked, its missile technology
would enable it to more than adequately defend itself.179 Thus, the
Soviets sustain a publicity campaign which emphasizes both the
175. Until the early 1960's the Soviet Union sought to convey the impression that it
had no military program of its own in space, and attempted to buttress this claim at the
political level in several ways. For example, the U.S.S.R. took a public stand in favor of
the "peaceful" uses of outer space, and attempted to contrast this with the allegation that
U.S. policy in space was overly "aggressive." See, e.g., Teplinski & Suprun, The Missile
Business in the U.S.A., 4 INT'rL AFF. 37 (Moscow 1960). Such tactics are attributed to a
Soviet program intended to discourage other countries from assisting the U.S. space
effort, e.g., through the provision of bases outside the U.S. for ground-tracking facilities;
to provide justification for Soviet non-cooperation in the international control of space
activities; and, to provide justification for the Soviets' own military space program. See
Horelick, supra note 170, at 67.
176. The desire of successive U.S. administrations to foster the public sharing of infor-
mation and international cooperation in space has caused tension between departments
within the government. For example, in 1961 the State Department co-sponsored a reso-
lution in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space calling for interna-
tional cooperation in space and public disclosure of space launches. 16 U.N. GAOR
Annexes, (Agenda Item 21) U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.301 (1961). This conflicted with the
Defense Department's policy of strict nondisclosure of the launching of military satel-
lites. Kecskemeti, supra note 174, at 34.
177. That the U.S. Defense Department has its own space program is a matter of
public knowledge.
178. Since no distinction is made in the U.S.S.R. between the military and civilian
aspects of its space program there can be no interdepartmental tension within the govern-
ment of the kind that occurs in the United States. See supra note 176. Any outward
inconsistencies as may become apparent in the Soviet space program (e.g., if it were to
conflict with the official Soviet stance in favor of "peaceful" activities in space) are
explained in terms of the dialectics of peace and war. Horelick, supra note 170, at 62-63.
179. In May 1962, the Soviet Union acknowledged for the first time that it was using
space for military purposes: "It would be a mistake to allow any superiority whatever to
the imperialist carnp in the sphere [of the military uses of outer space]. It is necessary to
oppose the imperialists with more effective means and methods of using space for mili-
tary defense." MILITARY STRATEGY 360-61 (V. Sokolovsky ed. 1962), quoted in Crane,
The Beginnings of Marxist Space Jurisprudence?, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 615, 617 (1963). In
the same year a leading Soviet authority on space law, G. Zhukov, affirmed that nothing
in the U.N. Charter (regarded as applicable to outer space) prevented the use of space for
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. G. Zhukov, Problems of Space Law at the
Present Stage, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 20, 21 (Bulgaria 1962).
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defensive nature of Soviet armaments and the allegedly "aggressive"
purposes of Western arms policy.180
C. THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF OUTER SPACE
The same considerations of strategic deterrence that apply to
weapons in the "inner space" of the seas will apply to weapons in
outer space, regardless of future trends in, and relevant attitudes
towards space-based armaments. Again, the goal is maximum invul-
nerability of both first- and second-strike weapons systems. The
technological threshold will admittedly be much higher, however,
not only because of the relatively backward state of present-day
space technology, but also because of the uniquely hostile space
environment. The more significant goals will include the evasion of
enemy radars and sensors in space, the penetration of enemy
defenses, the development of targeting accuracy and appropriate
codes for ground communication and control, and the ability to dis-
tinguish between bombardment and other satellites.
Even if the technological difficulties of meeting such goals are
overcome, it is necessary to evaluate how space weapons would com-
pare with other weapons, and what competitive advantage they
would have over land- and sea-based weapons.""
For states to embark on a large-scale militarization of outer
space, the space environment and space weapons systems must offer
an overall strategic potential superior to that offered by land and
land-based weapons or sea and sea-based weapons. If states become
embroiled in an arms race in outer space, funds and research will be
devoted to that effort, and programs for the military and economic
exploitation of the oceans will probably be postponed or cancelled.
Simultaneous research on both fronts would undoubtedly require an
outlay of funds that even the superpowers would find difficult to
meet.
The following quotation aptly summarizes the war/peace dialectic in Soviet armament
policy:
The appearance of the dreadful power of nuclear-ballistic weapons in the hands
of socialist states, which defend the law of peace and of peaceful coexistence,
guarantees the possibility in an everincreasing degree to prevent both small and
large misdemeanors and crimes by the imperialist states, and this consolidates
and stabilizes the entire international legal order.
M. Lazarev, Technical Progress and Contemporary International Law, in SOVETSKOYE
GosuDa sTvo I PaAvo, No. 12, 108 (1962) quoted in Crane, supra note 179, at 624.
180. See D. Rusk, New Frontiers of Science, Space and Foreign Policy, 42 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 931,934 (1962) for an official American criticism of Soviet political strategy
in space.
181. See T. Schelling, The Military Use of Outer Space: Bombardment Satellites, in
OUTER SPACE IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 170, at 97, 98.
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If the choice is between large-scale military research underwater
and large-scale military research in outer space, the powers are likely
to choose the former for two reasons. Underwater research ante-
dates space research, and underwater research is more likely to be
economically beneficial.' 82 On the other hand, the space programs
of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. provide neither superpower with a
significant military advantage over the other under current technol-
ogy. Additionally, these space programs exhibit little promise of
immediate economic gain.183
Space weapons are not-superior to land and sea-based weapons
with respect to either their offensive "first strike" capabilities or their
"second strike" retaliatory capabilities. Fixed targets on land are not
necessarily more vulnerable to space weapons than they are to weap-
ons on land or underwater. Similarly, it is unlikely that a space
weapon-such as a bombardment satellite-would be effective
against, for example, a deep-diving and highly mobile submarine. 8 4
Even if orbital weapons systems were maintained in space, they
would require complex networks for ground control.'8 5 Sophisti-
cated systems to control and monitor weapons systems in space
would most likely have to be located on terrestrial bases. Con-
squently, they would be targetable in the same way as would other
land-based weapons. Considering that the military move underwa-
ter was prompted by the vulnerability of land-based systems due to
more sophisticated detection devices and the increased accuracy of
missiles, the vulnerability of space communications centers on land
could strongly inhibit the militarization of outer space. 186
182. In fact, current investments in ocean research are on the threshold of yielding
tremendous military and economic dividends. The known economic wealth of the
oceans alone will exert a strong influence in favor of continued oceanological research.
In view of the close link between underwater economic and military research, this will
likely result in military spinoffs for the strategic planners of both nations. See supra text
accompanying note 18. In addition, from a purely military standpoint the attraction of
the ocean environment is strong enough by itself to spur intensified ocean research for
specifically designed military goals.
183. Military research in space clearly will reap some benefits (e.g., improved forecast-
ing, better radio and telecommunications links). These improvements will, however, be
minor rather than revolutionary. But see, A. Haley, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 1, 2
(1963).
184. See Schelling, supra note 181, at 103.
185. Such networks would control the transmission of targeting information to the
systems; would command the systems from the ground to vary or change their orbits for
evasive purposes; would regularly check on the systems' general efficiency and pliability;
and would receive signals back from the systems in response to particular instructions
from ground control. Id at 100-01.
186. Although the construction of underwater space centers cannot be entirely ruled
out, such a move seems unlikely for the foreseeable future for several reasons. First,
neither power possesses the requisite technology; second, the cost would be prohibitive;
third, the generally hostile environment of the seabed would render such construction
19821
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Space-based weapons systems nevertheless enjoy certain advan-
tages. First, a state's space-based weapons system would constitute
one more strike force in addition to land and sea-based strategic
forces. The greater the diversity within a country's offensive and
retaliatory forces, the greater its overall deterrent value.187 And, just
as a mobile sea-borne weapons system can be used for purposes of
demonstrative posturing in crisis situations, a space weapon such as
a satellite bombardment system could be deliberately positioned
above a target state to demonstrate military strength.
Further, provided that the conffict did not spill over into the
terrestrial realm, a war fought in outer space would have little or no
repercussions on the earth's environment. 8 8 Also, a nation whose
weapons were attacked in outer space, in order to avoid initiating a
mutual destruction of civilian populations, may feel compelled to
confine its counteraction to the enemy's outer space weapons. 18 9
Finally, a strategic war in space would involve few, if any, civilian
casualties-rendering more real the possibility of limited strategic
war. 190
If the space powers move to militarize outer space and wish to
utilize fully the advantages that space weaponry offers, they could
deploy the following systems and weapons: orbiting nuclear and
conventional bombardment satellites; communications and observa-
tion satellites to monitor the bombardment satellites or for other pur-
poses; orbiting anti-missile and anti-satellite systems; reconnaissance
difficult; and fourth, such centers would be detectable and targetable by deep-diving
submarines.
187. Diverse offensive and retaliatory forces would complicate the coordination of an
enemy's strike forces. If in addition to tracking down and destroying a highly mobile
(and therefore evasive) underwater force, the enemy had to keep track of space forces
which constantly varied and shifted their orbits at different points all around the globe,
or which remained parked in "hidden" orbit on the far side of the moon, it would be
difficult to ensure the total elimination of a rival's retaliatory force. The increased costs
attributable to coping with the additional threat from space would also disadvantage the
enemy.
For a futuristic but not entirely implausible description of the nature and strategy of
possible "dog-fights" in space, see Willenson & Clark, War's Fourth Dimension, NEws-
WEEK, Nov. 29, 1976, at 46.
A danger inherent in a state's ability to attack simultaneously from three points (land,
sea and space) is that it may be easier to penetrate its defenses thanks to the over-all
strain the state might suffer in accommodating its combined forces. See Schelling, supra
note 181, at 103-04. Also, offensive as well as retaliatory capacity could result in a leap
beyond the realm of assured destruction of the enemy to the point of "overkill." See
Healey, The Sputnik and Western Defense, 34 INT'L AFF. 145, 146-47 (1958).
188. See Willenson & Clark, supra note 187, at 47, 48.
189. Id It is possible, however, that although targeting may take place in space, the
launching of the offensive missile may take place on earth. This would invite retaliation
against land-based targets such as launch pads, silos, etc.
190. Schelling, supra note 181, at 101. See also, M. Golovine, CONFLICT IN SPACE: A
PATTERN OF WAR IN A NEW DIMENSION 113, 119 (1962).
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satellites; manned space stations; and, ground control facilities as
well as tracking stations located all over the globe. 191
The viability of space weapons will depend very much on their
deterrence value as well as on their vulnerability to attack. 192 The
existence of a satellite bombardment systemper se would provide
offensive capability as well as greater deterrent diversity. Greater
deterrent diversity, as indicated above, would contribute to the over-
all invulnerability of the deterrent force. This, in turn, would
improve first strike capability to the extent that the attacking state
could expect victory following its first strike.
D. THE EMERGENCE OF TREATY LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE
DEMILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
Even though large scale militarization of outer space does not
appear to be imminent, treaty law on the subject has evolved under
the aegis of the United Nations. An examination of this treaty law is
useful not only to evaluate the effectiveness of the regime it estab-
lishes, but also because an examination of this area of international
law, especially when examined in the historical as well as the present
context of state conduct, indicates that the drafters of the treaties did
not intend completely to demilitarize outer space.
191. Both powers have been developing anti-satellite and bombardment systems since
the late 1960's. Covault, New Soviet And-satellite Mission Boosts Backingfor U.S. Tests,
112 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April 28, 1980, at 20. For example, the Soviet Union has
been developing the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), as well as an anti-
satellite weapon known as the directed energy weapon, capable of destroying targets by
directing an intense beam of charged atomic particles. See S. Lay & H. Taubenfeld, THE
LAW RELATING TO ACTIvITIEs OF MAN IN SPACE 27 (1970); Robinson, Soviets Pushfor
Beam Weapon, 106 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 2, 1977, at 11.
The U.S. has been developing the Multi Orbital Bombardment System (MOBS), as
well as anti-satellite weapons which use laser beams. Anti-satellite Laser Weapons
Planned, 112 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 16, 1980, at 244; Covault, Anti-satellite
Design Weapon Advances, in id at 243.
192. A variety of factors could affect a weapon's vulnerability and effectiveness. For
example, reconnaissance satellites may prove useful in giving advance warning of ground
troop movements, but they may prove to be of little use in providing advance warning of
an impending missile attack, since warning of such an attack would be possible only after
the missiles had been fired. K. Knorr, The International Implications of Outer-Space
Activities, in OUTER SPACE IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 170, at 114, 123.
Reconnaissance vehicles could be programmed to perform an anti-satellite function
against bombardment satellites, assuming that the latter can be satisfactorily identified in
space. It is even possible that such vehicles could be equipped with anti-satellite missiles.
Their effectiveness would again depend on the vulnerability of bombardment satellites.
It should be noted that the vulnerability of terrestrial strategic weapons is not inversely
linked to the invulnerability of space weaponary; Le., increases in the invulnerability of
space weaponary do not necessarily render earth weapons nore targetable. The vulnera-
bility of earth weapons depends on other independent factors such as their numbers,
mobility and the effectiveness of their concealment.
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L Early Attempts Within the United Nations
The United Nations first approached the peaceful regulation of
activities in outer space in November 1957, when the General
Assembly adopted a resolution urging an international convention
on disarmament. 193 In an attempt to preserve its missile lead, the
Soviet Union opposed the General Assembly proposals and instead
advanced disarmament proposals that linked outer space disarma-
ment to terrestrial disarmament.1 94 In 1958, the General Assembly
attempted to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space.195 The Soviet Union again refused to participate on
the ground that the membership of the Committee did not equitably
represent western, socialist and neutral states.1 96
In response to the Soviet objections, the General Assembly
replaced the Ad Hoc Committee with a more broadly based perma-
nent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Outer Space
Committee). 197 In December 1961, the Outer Space Committee
drafted a resolution which the General Assembly unanimously
adopted.1 98 The Resolution contained two fundamental provisions:
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies
to outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all
States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national
193. G.A. Res. 1148 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
The Resolution also recommended "[tihe joint study of an inspection system designed to
ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful
and scientific purposes." Id at 4. The General Assembly adopted the Resolution barely
six days after the launching of the first Sputnik.
194. The Soviet Union's proposal specifically referred to U.S. military bases on earth.
Kecskemeti, supra note 174, at 33. It should have been apparent that the Soviet approach
would prove to be unworkable-thus leading to no agreement restricting activities in
outer space. The "peaceful uses of outer space" concept nevertheless became the focal
point of U.N. consideration of space matters.
195. G.A. Res. 1348 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
The Committee was established in May 1959, and consisted of eighteen members.
196. H. Reis, United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and Its
Legal Subcommittee, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, 217, 248-49 (1971).
The Committee nevertheless proceeded to study the matter with respect to both its
scientific and legal implications. Under the latter it identified six legal problems thought
to be the most urgent: (1) the question of freedom of outer space for exploration and use
for peaceful purposes on the basis of equality of states; (2) liability for injury or damage
caused by spacecrafts; (3) the allocation of radio frequencies; (4) the prevention of inter-
ference between spacecrafts and aircrafts; (5) the identification and registration of space-
crafts; and (6) questions respecting arrangements for the re-entry of astronauts and
restitution of spacecrafts. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, U.N. Doc. A/4141 (1959).
197. G.A. Res. 1472, (No. 16) at 5, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/
4354 (1959). The Outer Space Committee's mandate was to review the area of interna-
tional cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses. Id
198. G.A. Res. 1721 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
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appropriation. 199
The Resolution also requested the Outer Space Committee to
study measures to promote cooperation in space.20° The Committee
therefore set up two subcommittees, one on Scientific and Technical
Matters, and the other on Legal Matters.20' The Technical Subcom-
mittee was able to recommend unanimously the publication of infor-
mation of interest on national space programs to nations beginning
space research.20 2
In the Legal Subcommittee, certain differences among the space
powers prevented agreement. The Soviet Union pressed for a decla-
ration of a set of general principles regulating all aspects of space
activity, while the U.S. favored dealing with specific questions in the
order of their importance.20 3 The Soviet Union also insisted on
including in the declaration the prohibition of surveillance by "spy"
satellites, the use of satellites for "propaganda" and the launching of
satellites by entities other than governments. 2°4 The U.S., on the
other hand, maintained that surveillance weapons were not aggres-
sive weapons and should not be prohibited. Further, the U.S. would
not agree to prohibit the private use of commercial satellites. 20 5 The
powers' eventual willingness to compromise was manifested by their
signing the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963
Resolution).206
The 1963 Resolution did not contain any bans on "spy" satel-
lites, nor did it ban satellite launchings by nongovernment agencies.
It did contain an enumerative list of "general" principles as the
199. Id
200. Id
201. U.N. Doc. A/5109 (1962). The work of the Technical Subcommittee proved eas-
ier than that of the Legal Subcommittee, a predictable reflection of the fact that clear
guidelines on space policy had either not yet evolved to facilitate rule creation, or else
were the subject matter of dispute between the two space powers.
202. See A. Frutkin & 0. Anderson, The Scientfic and Technical Subcommittee of the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN SPACE 262, 262-63 (1965).
203. Reis, supra note 196, at 252. The specific areas recommended for study included
liability for spacecraft accidents, the recovery of spacecraft, and the rescue of astronauts.
204. Id
205. Id In view of these differences, the two powers failed to reach an early agree-
ment. See U.N. Doc. A/5181 (1962).
206. G.A. Res. 1962 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 Resolution]. The 1963 Resolution represented a compromise
between the Soviet stand in favor of a declaration of general principles and the U.S.
preference for dealing with specific questions in an order of priority. The 1963 Resolu-
tion contained fairly specific provisions as well as a modified list of general principles.
See infra text accompanying note 207.
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U.S.S.R. had requested,20 7 and it did address the specific questions
of liability for spacecraft accidents, the recovery of spacecrafts, and
questions raised by the United States regarding the rescue of
astronauts.
The principles combined in the 1963 Resolution were not
entirely the product of negotiations within the United Nations. Var-
ious international bodies had been active during the preceding
twenty-five years to lay the foundation for the 1963 Resolution. For
example, various writers had argued that terrestrial notions of sover-
eignty should not extend to outer space, that outer space and celestial
bodies must be open to all humanity, and that neither can be subject
to national appropriation.20 8 The question of the liability of a
launching state for damage or accidents caused by its spacecraft had
also been widely discussed prior to the formulation of the 1963 Reso-
lution.209 Finally, even the question of the "peaceful uses" of outer
space antedated the 1963 Resolution. A concern for the peaceful use
of space originally arose in the context of the preservation of, and the
accessibility to celestial bodies for all humanity.210
2. The Outer Space Treaty
Commentators aptly refer to the 1963 Resolution as the
"Twelve Tables of the Law of Space."21' In effect, the Resolution
laid the foundation for the emergence of all future treaty law on
207. The principles of the 1963 Resolution established a framework for future agree-
ments in the field of outer space law. In part, the principles declare: that outer space
exploration is open to all mankind; that celestial bodies are not subject to national appro-
priation; that the U.N. Charter applies to all activities in outer space exploration; that the
launching state and each state from whose territory a launch takes place are liable for all
damage subsequently caused by the space object involved; that ownership of space
objects remains in the launching state, and that such objects must be returned to the
launching state on demand; that the spirit of cooperation will govern experiments in
outer space; and that astronauts are envoys of mankind, thus commanding the aid of any
state in the event of accident, distress or emergency landing. See 1963 Resolution, supra
note 206 at 15, 16.
208. See, e.g., Cheng, Problems of Space Law, 19 THE NEW SCIENTISTS, May, 1960,
1256, 1257 quotedin L. Lipson & N. Katzenbach, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 137 (1961);
Haley, Basic Concepts of Space Law, 26 JET PROPULSION, Nov., 1966, 951-68, quoted in
id at 162; C. Jenks, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 389 (1958); P. Jessup & H.
Taubenfeld, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE 258, 276-80 (1959).
209. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & I. Vlasic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE
613-20 (1963); Beresford, Liabilityfor Ground Damage Caused by Spacecraft, 19 FED.
BAR. J. 242 (July 1959); Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 3, 31.
210. See, e.g., 0. Schacter, Recent Technological Developments: Political and Legal
Implicationsfor the International Community, AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 245, 248 (Fifth
Session 1958). See also E. Pepin, Space Penetration, in id at 228, 233-34; D. Goedhuis,
Air Soveregnty and the Legal Status of Outer Space, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoCIA-
TION 272 (Hamburg 1960); D. Goedhuis, General Questions on the Legal Regime of
Space, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 72, 77 (Brussels 1962); Lipson & Katzen-
bach, supra note 208, at 3, 24-27.
211. C. Jenks, SPACE LAW 177 (1965).
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space, 212 including the first treaty on space law: the Outer Space
Treaty.213 The Outer Space Treaty was opened for signatures in
January 1967, and became effective in October 1967.
While the Outer Space Treaty restates many of the principles
contained in the 1963 Resolution, it also contains several new provi-
sions. The most important provision is found in Article IV:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to
the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military
bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and
the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.
The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility neces-
sary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall
also not be prohibited.
2 14
Article IV implies that outer space and celestial bodies are to be
treated separately for purposes of demilitarization. There is no
express reservation for the use of outer space "exclusively for peace-
ful purposes" as there is in the case of the Moon and other celestial
bodies. In addition, the ban on "the establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any types of weapons
and the conduct of military manoeuvres" applies to celestial bodies
only; the ban is not extended in haec verba to that area of space
around the earth where only nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction are banned. Finally, the ban on activities on celes-
tial bodies is more wide-ranging than that on outer space activities.
The first paragraph of Article IV-dealing primarily with outer
space "around the earth"-also makes references to celestial bodies;
the second paragraph-dealing with the Moon and celestial bodies-
makes no reference whatsoever to outer space.
In this way Article IV preserves the present state of total non-
212. The 1963 Resolution led to the conclusion of a treaty on the activities of states in
outer space and on celestial bodies in 1967, a treaty on the rescue of astronauts in 1968, a
convention on liability in 1971, and a treaty governing the activities of states on the moon
and other celestial bodies in 1979.
213. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50.
Two space events occurred in the years following the 1963 Resolution which led to the
emergence of the first treaty on space law. The first was the soft-landing of the Soviet
Union's Luna 9 in February 1966. The second was President Johnson's declaration, in
May 1966, that the U.S. was prepared to conclude an international convention on the
general principles governing the activities of states in outer space. Ries, supra note 196,
at 225. These events prompted the negotiations between the two powers that led to the
formulation of the Outer Space Treaty.
214. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. IV.
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militarization of celestial bodies, 215 while it requires only partial
demilitarization of circumterrestrial space. It is possible to argue
that because the Outer Space Treaty only prohibits nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction in circumterrestrial space, it
should permit the deployment of conventional weapons, including
non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons in that area.216 In that event
there would be no way of verifying whether, for example, an anti-
satellite system, purported to be non-nuclear, was not actually
equipped with nuclear weapons. 217
The machinery of inspection that Article XII of the Outer Space
Treaty describes further emphasizes the dichotimization of treatment
of outer space and celestial bodies. It provides: "All stations, instal-
lations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celes-
tial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to
the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity .... ,,218 Thus, verification is
permitted only where total non-militarization is prescribed; le., on
celestial bodies but not in outer space, nor, for that matter, on earth-
based centers.219 Significantly, the Outer Space Treaty does not pro-
vide for verification at all with respect to its ban on nuclear and mass
destruction weapons under Article IV.
E. QUESTIONS ARISING UNDER THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The two principal loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty concern
its allowance of some militarization of near-earth space, and the fact
that verification under it is possible only with respect to celestial
bodies but not with respect to circumterrestrial space. These loop-
holes raise questions as to the precise extent of the scope of the
Treaty's prohibitions. The following sections examine such ques-
tions with a view towards clarifying exactly what the Treaty prohib-
its, as well as what it permits.
215. Cf. Zedalis, WillArticle III of the Moon Treaty Improve Existing Law? A Tex-
tua Analyss, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAV'L L.J. 53 (1980). Mr. Zedalis argues that Article
IV(l) could be read as not prohibiting the installation of nuclear and non-destruction
weapons on celestial bodies if such an installation was only on a temporary basis. Id at
57.
216. See D. Goedhuis, Some Legal Problems Arising From the Utilization of Outer
Space, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 422,426 (The Hague 1970). Mr. Goedhuis
points out that this need not cause surprise, since in the present power structure the
security interests of a state take precedence over any other interests. Id
217. See generally Zedalis & Wade,Anti-satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty
of.1967, 8 CALIF. W. INT'L LJ. 454, 459 (1978).
218. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. XII.
219. See N. Poulantzas, The Outer Space Treaty of Jan. 27, 1967 and its Aftermath, in
TENTH COLLOQUIM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 209, 213-14 (1967). Earth-based cen-
ters might be used for launchings, communications, tracking, etc.
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L D§6ning "Peaceful Purpose" Under the Outer Space Treaty
Within the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, two schools of thought have emerged regarding the legal
meaning of the term "peaceful. ' 220 One school interprets the term as
the opposite of "military," while the other maintains that "peaceful"
means "non-aggressive."' 221 Western states, including the U.S., have
tended to favor the latter interpretation, while the Soviet Union,
together with certain other members of the Outer Space Committee,
favor the former.222
In considering the relevance of these two interpretations as
applied to the Outer Space Treaty, one must bear in mind the dis-
tinction between the Treaty's treatment of outer space around the
earth on the one hand, and its treatment of the moon and other
celestial bodies on the other. As outlined in the previous section, the
Treaty adopted different substantive regimes to regulate the demilita-
rization of each zone.223 For this reason, the term "peaceful" cannot
be applied uniformly to both areas; its meaning varies with the con-
text in which it is used in the Treaty.
a. The Regime of Non-Militarization on and Around the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies
The Outer Space Treaty prescribes total non-militarization of
activities on the Moon and celestial bodies, with a simultaneous
injunction that these moon activities be used "exclusively for peace-
ful purposes. '224 In this context it is arguable that all activities on the
surface of the Moon and other celestial bodies must be "non-mili-
tary." This interpretation does not affect in any way the legal status
of activities around celestial bodies. If the ban is construed strictly,
then it only applies to surface activity and not to orbital activity.
However, because the Treaty's objective is clearly the total non-mili-
tarization of celestial bodies, it is also arguable that military activity
around celestial bodies would contravene the ban and conflict with
the reservation of the use of celestial bodies "exclusively for peaceful
purposes. '"225
220. See Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 25-26.
221. For further discussion, see Zedalis, supra note 215, at 62-63.
222. Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 25-26.
223. See supra notes 214-218 and accompanying text.
224. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. IV, para. 2.
225. One may note that the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and other Celestial Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/L.1 13/Add. 4 (1979) openedfor
signature Dec. 18, 1979, hereinafter cited as the Moon Treaty, seeks to eliminate this
difficulty. After reaffirming the use of the Moon "exclusively for peaceful purposes," the
Moon Treaty provides:
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To justify the view that there is to be total non-militarization of
the moon, then, one must argue that: (a) total non-militarization has
been prescribed on the moon; (b) the moon is to be used "exclusively
for peaceful purposes"; (c) the deployment of non-mass destruction
weapons in circumlunar space would not be an "exclusively peace-
ful" use of the moon; and, (d) such weapons make uncertain and
temporary an otherwise clear and permanent regime of non-militari-
zation on the moon.
b. The Regime of Demilitarization in Circumterrestrial Space
The language of the Outer Space Treaty indictes that it requires
only partial non-militarization of the outer space surrounding the
earth.226 Unlike its provision with respect to celestial bodies, the
Treaty does not reserve this circumterrestrial space for "peaceful
uses." There are, however, references in the preamble to the effect
that the peaceful use of outer space is in the common interest of all
mankind and is conducive to international cooperation. 227 The
Outer Space Treaty further provides that Parties "shall carry on
activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or
around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on the
moon shall be forbidden...
Id art. III.
The Moon Treaty does not completely overcome the aforementioned difficulty. Para-
graph 3 of Article III prohibits nuclear and mass destruction weapons on and around the
moon. Paragraph 4 prohibits all other weapons, installations, etc. "on the Moon."
(emphasis provided). It does not expressly prohibit deployment of conventional and
non-mass destruction weapons around the moon. Thus both the Outer Space Treaty and
the Moon Treaty maintain a peculiar silence on circumlunar activity involving non-
nuclear and non-mass destruction weapons. See generally, Zedalis, supra note 215, at 56-
61.
Although the verification clause of the Moon Treaty is an improvement over the verifi-
cation clause of the Outer Space Treaty, it still appears to restrict inspection to only those
vehicles, stations, etc., that are "on the moon." Moon Treaty, supra at art. XV. (emphasis
provided). The more positive advances in Article XV are (1) that inspection is not based
on reciprocity; (2) that a request for consultation creates a binding obligation on the
party receiving the request to enter into consultation with the party requesting it; (3) that
any party may participate in the consultation; and, (4) that any party may unilaterally
seek the "assistance" of the Secretary General "in order to resolve the controversy." ld
art. XV, para. 3. The Secretary General does not, however, enjoy an express power to
compel a settlement.
226. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
227. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at preamble. The Preamble provides in part:
The States Parties to this Treaty,
[Recognize] the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the explora-
tion and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, [and]
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Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting interna-
tional cooperation and understanding."228
It would not be unreasonable, therefore, to deduce that the par-
ties intended all outer space activity-including that around the
earth-to be "peaceful." Yet, as stated before, the meaning of the
term "peaceful" in any specific case depends on the context in which
it is used. Under the Outer Space Treaty, outer space activity may
not contravene any norm of international law in general, or the pro-
visions of the U.N. Charter in particular.22 9 Further, the activities
cannot include the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction in outer space. 30 If one proceeds on the princi-
ple that what is not expressly prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty is
permitted by it, the permitted activity must at least be consistent with
the U.N. Charter and general international law. In the context of the
U.N. Charter and international law the term "peaceful" generally
means the opposite of "aggressive."' 3I Under this interpretation,
any activity which does not constitute an attack upon or threat
against the territorial integrity and independence of another state
would be permissible under the Treaty.232
Consequently, if the term "peaceful" is interpreted to mean
"non-aggressive" and not "non-military," then the Outer Space
Treaty should permit all defensive military activity that is not
aggressive, including the development of orbital weapons systems. 233
Only this interpretation is consonant with the Treaty's consistent
policy of maintaining a separation between the armament regimes of
circumterrestrial space and of celestial bodies.234
[Desire] to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as well
as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses.
Id
228. Id art. III.
229. Id
230. Id art. IV.
23 1. Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 25. See also E. Galloway, Interpreting
the Treaty on Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 143, 145 (1967); A. Meyer, Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in the
Light of the Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 24, 27 (1968).
232. Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 25-26. See also N. Kittrie, 'ggressive"
Uses of Space Vehicles--the Remedies in International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 1, 203-04 (1961).
233. For example, if "peaceful" means "non-aggressive," then the Outer Space Treaty
would permit the use of space objects and stations for military communications and stra-
tegic reconnaissance.
234. At the expense of repetition it is worth summarizing the evidence of this separa-
tion in the Outer Space Treaty: (1) that the phrase "exclusively for peaceful purposes"
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2 Surveillance and Verfication
It is unlikely that the space powers would accept a non-militari-
zation treaty that infringes on a state's traditional right to monitor
threats to its own security. Certain purely passive defensive devices,
such as sensors and listening devices, which cannot themselves be
used as attack weapons, should be allowed on the surface of celestial
bodies or in orbit.235 Should the defensive listening and monitoring
devices disclose a contravention of the Outer Space Treaty's ban on
militarization in a manner that threatens a state's security, then,
depending on the magnitude, urgency or seriousness of the threat, all
the remedies of self-defense available under international customary
law should become available to the threatened state regardless of the
ban.236
Unfortunately, the Outer Space Treaty does not approach the
problem of verification with the boldness with which it approaches
the non-militarization of celestial bodies. Article XII of the Treaty
represents the timid approach characteristic of all international
inspection schemes. It is consensual and reciprocal: "All stations,
installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other
celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Par-
ties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity ... .
Even if the term "on the Moon and other celestial bodies" is
interpreted to include all stations, installations and equipment in
orbit around the moon and celestial bodies, the verification arrange-
ments of the Treaty do not measure up to the standard required by
which appears in Article IV(2) (dealing with celestial bodies) does not figure anywhere in
Article IV(l) (dealing primarily with outer space around the earth); (2) that the wording
of the ban in Article IV(2) was not used in Article IV(l); (3) that the ban under Article
IV(2) is more wide-ranging than that under Article IV(l) because the ban under the latter
was expressly extended to celestial bodies while the more comprehensive ban under the
former was not extended to near-earth space; and (4) that the machinery for inspection
under Article XII was made applicable only to activities on celestial bodies (including the
Moon) and not to activities in outer space around the earth. See supra notes 214-18 and
accompanying text.
235. See Lay & Taubenfeld, supra note 191, at 187, n.30. The Outer Space Treaty
would permit defensive attack weapons if it were not for the comprehensive ban under
Article IV(2). Cf. Poulantzas, supra note 219, at 210. Mr. Poulantzas argues that an
activity is peaceful if it is "non-armed."
236. See Zedalis, supra note 215, at 69-71. Self-defense can occur, however, only after
a state contravenes the ban.
It may be that this right is illusory in view of the distances involved between the earth
and celestial bodies. If the treaty-breaking state has already installed attack weapons it
may be too late for a threatened state to take defensive measures should the other decide
'to act aggressively. By the same token, however, the aggressor would have to contend
with the same distances in making its preparations. Effective international surveillance
and verification arrangements would arguably be able to detect such aggressive prepara-
tions on earth.
237. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. XII.
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the far-reaching "exclusively for peaceful purposes" ban in Article
IV.238
The Outer Space Treaty, therefore, forces states to develop what
means they can at the national level to monitor rival parties' compli-
ance with the Treaty. The same situation has existed with respect to
other treaties. For example, after the signing of the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty,239 nuclear radiation and blast sensing devices were
developed which define with surprising accuracy where a blast took
place, what yield was used, and in the case of an atmospheric test,
what materials were used.240 As early as 1960, the U.S. launched
satellite surveillance systems such as MIDAS (Missile Defense
Alarm System) and SAMOS (Satellite and Missile Observation Sys-
tem).24' These systems were designed to trace enemy missile bases
on earth as well as to provide early warning of a missile attack after
the launching of the missile-carrying rockets. 242 Similarly, the U.S.
developed orbital inspection and control systems within satellites
with optical, radar, infra-red, ultra-violet, and other sensing devices
which are not only able to pin-point locations of factories or launch
complexes, but which can also indicate the build-up and range of
activities at such factories and complexes.243 Furthermore, the space
powers have been developing vast networks of land-based sensing
devices that work in conjunction with earth orbiting satellites, mak-
ing it almost impossible to launch any type of orbital payload or to
conduct any underground blasts without detection. 244
Since the militarization of celestial bodies has not yet occurred,
the scope of future militarization is pure conjecture. It is clear, how-
ever, that the most effective guarantee for a ban on militarization
under the Outer Space Treaty will be bilateral and multilateral ver-
ification arrangements. In the absence of a strong scheme for the
238. See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
239. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 37.
240. P. Klass, Secret Sentries in Space 185-87 (1971). These highly sensitive nuclear
sensing devices carried aboard Vela satellites policed the Test Ban Treaty throughout the
late 1960's. Although the Vela series of launches ended in 1970, Vela-type sensing
devices are still carried aboard early warning system satellites. See also L. Meeker,
Observations in Space, in LAW AND POLITCS IN SPACE 75-84 (M. Cohen ed. 1964); Lay &
Taubenfeld, supra note 19 1, at 103-14; J. Morenoff, World Peace Through Space Law 60-
66 & 70-71 (1967).
241. Lay & Taubenfeld, supra note 191, at 32.
242. Id
243. Klass, supra note 240, at 145-46.
Despite the non-availability of Soviet sources on such matters, the Soviet Union has
publicly intimated that it too has launched "spy" satellites. Morenoff, supra note 240, at
65-66. See also W. Hyman, MAGNA CARTA OF SPACE 127, 145 (1966).
244. See H. Shiffer & P. Snyders, The Needfor Enforcement for International Space
Treaties, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
237, 238 (1967).
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international verification of activities in outer space, it is likely that
the aforementioned devices will continue to be developed at the
national level.245
3. The Principle of "Common Interests" and "Peaceful Uses"
a. The Meaning of "Common Interests"
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty provides that "[t]he explora-
tion and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind. 2 46 One
may argue that Article I converts the principle of the use of outer
space for "the interests of all countries" into a legal norm.2 47 In that
event, Article I forbids any activity in outer space that is not a use in
the interest of all countries.248 Since defensive military activity in
space by a state to protect its own security would not be a use in the
interest of all states, it would be unlawful.
There are several objections to this argument. First, it ignores
the legislative history of the principle of the use of outer space for the
benefit of all mankind. Since the early days of space activity the
non-space powers have been concerned that the space powers may
appropriate space for their own benefit, and might even use it to the
detriment of non-space powers.2 49 For this reason the Outer Space
Committee used expressions such as the "common interest of man-
245. The immediacy of this problem prompted the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space to recommend that its Legal Subcommittee consider the legal implications
of remote sensing of the earth from space as a matter of "high priority." Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) at 8,
U.N. Doc. A/32/20 (1977). Other matters of high priority included the question of a
draft treaty relating to the Moon and the elaboration of principles governing the use of
satellites for direct television broadcasting. See Report of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee on Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, in id at 8-11. The Subcom-
mittee's report does not, however, broach the subject of military surveillance from space.
See generally Polter, Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4 J. SPACE L. 99 (Fall 1976).
The following year the Subcommittee presented a set of draft principles on remote sens-
ing. Report of the Legal Subcommittee to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. 33 U.N. GAOR Annex III at 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/218 (1978).
246. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. I, para. 1.
247. See Markoff, Disarmament and "peaceful Purposes" Provisions in the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 5-7 (Spring 1976). See also G. GAI, SPACE LAW 164-72
(1969); M. Markov, Against the So-Called Broader Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful"
in International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 73, 75 (1968); M. Nicia, What is the Meaning of the Use of Cosmos Exclu-
sively For Peaceful PurposesZ in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 224 (1974); M. Lachs, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 105-09
(1972).
248. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 217, at 472-73.
249. Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 27.
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kind," and the "use of outer space for the benefit of all countries," to
indicate that space and celestial bodies should be open to all states
on a basis of "equality." The Committee also stated that space activ-
ity should be for "purely scientific purposes" to emphasize the non-
discriminatory use of space. In sum, one space power was not to use
outer space against the other, nor was either power to use outer space
against the interests of non-space powers.250
The "common interest" principle has been used consistently
over the past two decades for the following reasons:
(1) to emphasize the formal equality of all states in decisionmaking in space
and to ensure their participation in delimiting international rules governing
space activity;
(2) to. ensure that space and celestial bodies should not be open to national
appropriation;25 1
(3) to ensure free, non-discriminatory and equal access to space and celes-
tial bodies by all states; and,
(4) to ensure that space activity is at least not prejudicial to the national
interests of non-space powers.
If Article I is read in view of the above purposes of the "com-
mon interest" principle, its reference to this principle is not startling.
The Article provides in full:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,
and shall be the province of mankind.
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be
free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
250. L. Lipson and N. Katzenbach, two noted commentators on space law, also note
the fear of the small states "that the two space powers might act immoderately with
regard to each other, or might do things in space which non-space powers regard asinimical to their interests." Lipson & Katzenbach, supra note 208, at 27. The writers
comment:
Hence their [e., the small states'] emphasis on a legal regime which insists that
uses of space be 'peaceful,' that space powers act 'reasonably,' that due regard be
given to principles of 'equality,' and so forth. While they do not appear to desire
a regime that would allow to each ... state an unqualified veto. . ., neither
would they wholeheartedly approve a regime that authorized the space powers to
decide unilaterally (or even, conceivably, bilaterally) what was permissible.
Id (footnote omitted).
251. One General Assembly Resolution has urged "the joint study of an inspection
system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclu-
sively. for peaceful scientific purposes." G.A. Res. 1148, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18)
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957). See also G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17)
at 6, U.N. Doe. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res. 1802, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 5, U.N.
Doe. A/5127 (1962); G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doe. A/
5515 (1963); and G.A. Res. 1963, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 16, U.N. Doe. A/
5515 (1963). Each of these resolutions emphasizes the theme of the "common interest" of
mankind in space activity on the basis of equality and the non-appropriation of space
and celestial bodies.
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There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, includ-
ing the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and
encourage international cooperation in such investigation.
2 52
Article I can be viewed as a reaffirmation by the parties of the
traditional principles of equality, free access, non-discrimination and
non-appropriation. There is nothing in the Article that indicates that
a particular activity would be unlawful if it was not specifically
designed to be of general beneft to the world, or is not designed to
benefit the interests of all countries.253
Adopting the argument that defensive activity in outer space is
unlawful under the Outer Space Treaty because it would not be "for
the benefit and in the interest of all countries" would lead to several
consequences. First, it would ignore the express meaning of Article
IV which, as explained above, does not permit the equating of
"peaceful" with "non-military. ' 254 In fact, during the negotiations
preceeding the emergence of the final draft of the Outer Space
Treaty, the Outer Space Committee rejected a proposal that the term
"exclusively for peaceful purposes" be extended to all outer space
areas.255 Second, too liberal a use of the "common interests" argu-
ment would severely limit pioneering space activity even in the non-
military field if the activity were of no direct benefit to, or not in the
interests of, all countries. 256 Third, the above argument leads to the
rather short-sighted conclusion that even non-aggressive space
projects which lead to measurable benefits to a specific country or
group of countries cannot coexist with projects of general benefit to
252. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. I.
253. The Soviet Union has always resisted the argument that the "common heritage of
mankind" principle, paraphrased in Article I, imports legally binding obligations. The
Soviet commentator B. Dudakov, for example, points out that it is too early to speculate
about the common sharing of profits arising from space activity because space activity
has not yet reached that stage. Attempts to define this principle would, in his opinion, be
analogous to an attempt "to sell the bearskin before someone has caught the bear." B.
Dudakov, The Outer Space Treaty and Subsequent Scientific Development of International
Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 107, 108 (1974). Dudakov maintains that the specific rights and interests
of the community of states, as well as their obligations, can arise only through "special
agreements" between those states. Id at 111. See also R. Dekanozov, JuridcalNature of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in id at 200.
254. See supra notes 214-16, 220-34 and accompanying text.
255. See 21 U.N. GAOR C.2 (66th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/C.2/SR.66
(1966). Another proposal to introduce the term "use for peaceful purposes" into the text
of Article 1 also failed. See 21 U.N. GAOR C.2 (65 mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/
C.2/SR.63 (1966). Finally, an attempt to include the term in the title on the Treaty failed
as well. See 21 U.N. GAOR c.2 (65 mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/C.2/SR.
256. The innumerable difficulties of defining what is a "benefit" and what is an "inter-
est" would also present problems. Whether activities such as the launching of the world's
first Sputnik, or the manned and unmanned lunar and Martian landings, or the launch-
ing of dogs, rats and spiders in space "benefit" all countries and advance their "interests"
is questionable.
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all states. Neither Article IV nor the Treaty as a whole forbids spe-
cific non-aggressive projects for the benefit of individual countries on
the ground that they do not benefit other countries as well. 257
b. "Common Interests" with Respect to Military Uses
The argument that all activity in space must be non-military
would not be consonant with current space power practice.258 The
military dimension of the U.S. space program is a matter of public
knowledge. While the Soviet Union refuses to acknowledge offi-
cially any military activity in space,259 there can be no doubt that it is
257. See D. Goedhuis, supra note 216, at 440. See also Fasan, The Meaning of the
Term "Mankind"in Space LegalLanguage, 2 J. SPACE L. 125 (Fall 1974). Although Mr.
Fasan argues that the term "mankind" has emerged as a new legal concept, he does not
attempt to explain what kinds of space activities are in the "interest of mankind" or for
its "benefit," nor does he offer any guide for measuring "interest" or "benefit." For a
more detailed outline of the uncertainties of the "benefit and interest" clause, see S.
Gorove, Limitations on the Principle of Freedom of Exploration and Use in the Outer Space
Treaty. Benet and Interests, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 74 (1970).
In reference to the "common use" principle, the Soviet commentator Zhukov observes:
Since all states are sovereign and equal, outer space is open and free for the
exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind and on a
basis of complete equality. Granting the right to all states freely to explore and
use outer space is not confined to recognition of their specific rights. It also
means the assumption of certain obligations on their part. . . that the states will
not hamper one another in their space research. In other words, they must
respect one another's rights and interests in outer space and on celestial bodies.
G. Zhukov, Fundamental Princiles of Space Law, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 263, 267-68 (B. Tunkin ed. 1969). A nearly identical passage appears in the 1976
Soviet book on space law, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (A. Piradov ed. 1976).
By emphasing the principles of equality, non-discrimination and the use of space in
ways not prejudicial .to the interests of other states engaged in space exploration,
Zhukov's interpretation is consistent with the interpretation suggested by the present
writer. For a parallel U.S. view, see U.S. Representative Plimpton's statement before the
U.N. Outer Space Committee on March 19, 1962, reprinted in 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 809
(1962).
258. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
259. In 1960 the Soviet Union seemed to have terminated its vigorous opposition to
,"espionage" satellites. See Zhukov, Space Espionage Plans and International Law, 36
INT'L AFF. 53, 53 (Moscow 1960); Korovin, Peaceful Cooperation in Space, 38 INT'L AFF.
61, 63 (Moscow 1962). See also Zedalis & Wade, supra note 217, at 476.
In November 1963, the Soviet Union made another major concession by dropping its
long-standing opposition to space vehicles equipped with photographic equipment.
Horelick, supra note 170, at 69. Then, in 1964, the Soviet Union tacitly admitted its use
of surveillance satellites. Times Herald, May 30, 1964 at Al, col. 5. In the article report-
ing the admission, Khrushchev urged that U.S. aerial reconnaissance flights over Cuba
be discontinued. He is reported to have offered to show Soviet satellite photographs of
the U.S. to President Johnson to prove that the U.S. could take such photographs of
Cuba through its own satellites, instead of conducting aerial reconnaissance over Cuba.
Id
Recent Soviet writing, while not expressly endorsing such practice, refrains from criti-
cizing it. See generally INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (A. Piradow ed. 1976). In their
examination of the fundamental principles of space law, the various Russian authors fail
to mention surveillance satellites.
56 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
engaged in such activity.260 According to American reports both
powers have been conducting anti-satellite tests since the 1960's,261
and the U.S.S.R. is reported to have developed a "hunter-killer"
anti-satellite system which can intercept and destroy satellites in
space. 262
Finally, there are indications, in the post-1967 era, that even the
Soviet Union publicly supports the view that not every military
activity in space is unlawful. The Soviet Union has not, for example,
interpreted the common interests principle or Article I of the Space
Treaty in a way that prohibits all military activity in outer space.263
260. See, e.g., Robinson, Soviets Pushfor Beam Weapon, 109 Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH. May 2, 1977, at 16; Newsweek, Nov. 29, 1976, at 46.
261. Several arguments can be given to justify the space powers' current use of recon-
naissance satellites. In the absence of compulsory international inspection, space recon-
naissance is the only available confidence-building mechanism that can allay mutual
fears of surprise attack and other treaty violations. Also, reconnaissance may be consid-
ered a peaceful activity in that it is non-agressive. Lay & Taubenfeld, supra note 191, at
78. Even if reconnaisance infringes upon the laws of national states, it is not an interna-
tional crime. In any case, reconnaissance satellites orbit in a zone beyond the reach of
national/municipal law so that their operation is literally "above the law." See McMa-
hon, Legal.Aspects ofOuter Space, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 339, 367-69 & 380 (1962); M.
Vazquez, COSMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 165-71 (1965). Mr Vazquez argues that because
satellite reconnaissance takes place outside municipal jurisdiction it is inappropriate to
compare it to aerial reconnaissance via conventional aircraft, which, he argues, is illegal
if it violates national airspace. Id at 168. Vazquez further maintains that in an age
when radio waves from different countries constantly invade other countries' airspace,
satellite photography should be even less objectionable because it does not involve the
transmission of any waves into territorial airspace; the satellite camera merely collects or
receives light waves from the ground. Id at 171. Cf GAly supra note 247, at 178.
262. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1977 at All, col. 4; Covault, supra note 190, at 20.
It is likely that the Soviet Union, as a space power, has launched satellites for purposes
of survellance, military communication and intelligence-gathering. In April 1980 the
Soviet Union was reported to have launched at least four surveillance satellites (Cosmos
1172, 1173, 1176 and 1177). Soviets Launch Surveillance Spacecraft, 112 Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., May 5, 1980, at 25; Covault, supra note 190, at 20. The United States does
not regard such steps to be illegalperse. See, e.g., Lipson, An Argument on the Legality of
Reconnaissance Satellites, 55 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 174 (First Sess. 1961); Note, Legal
Aspects ofReconnaissance in Airspace and Outer Space, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1074 (1961).
See also Meeker, supra note 240, at 75. Other commentators argue that reconnaissance
satellites may be used in pursuit of an "inherent" right of self-defense, including antici-
patory self-defense. Morenoff, supra note 243, at 232-37; Hosenball, Current Issues of
Space Law Before the United Nations, 2 J. SPACE L. 5, 15-17 (Spring 1974).
263. Lay & Taubenfeld, supra note 191, at 187.
Zhukov recognizes the distinction drawn by the Outer Space Treaty between demilita-
rization in outer space on the one hand, and the demilitarization of celestial bodies on
the other. He writes: "If agreement on the complete demilitarization of outer space is
reached in the future, the principle concerning the partial demilitarization of outer space
and complete demilitarization of celestial bodies will be replaced by the principle gov-
erning the use of oiter space exclusively for peaceful purposes." Zhukov, supra note 257,
at 276-77.
Zhukov also expressly admits the possibility of specific military uses of space: "The
principle of non-aggression by no means precludes the use of outer space for striking
back at an aggressor in self-defense. In other words, it does not mean prohibition of the
use of outer space for military aims in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
... ." Id at 272.
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Neither power regards the use of outer space for military defense as
inconsistent with the principle of common interest.
In view of the fact that both powers are using outer space for at
least some military purposes, it is unlikely that they intended,
through a principle as vague as the "common interests," to ban all
military activity in space by signing the Outer Space Treaty.
F. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE UNDER THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY
In view of the loopholes within the existing regime of demilita-
rization and verification in outer space, the space powers are likely:
(1) to refrain, for the foreseeable future, from militarizing the moon
and other celestial bodies (almost as much due to technological and
fiscal difficulties as due to the Treaty's prohibitions); (2) to develop
their own (Ze., national) early warning surveillance and detection
devices; (3) to resort to overt or covert defensive activities on and
around the earth for non-aggressive purposes; (4) to extend these
activities to celestial bodies; and (5) to continue the search for mutu-
ally satisfactory verification arrangements that guarantee certainty
and reliability.
It is therefore tempting to draw conclusions similar to those
drawn regarding the 1971 Seabed Treaty. By signing the Outer
Space Treaty, the signatories agreed to refrain from doing something
with no potential for immediate strategic use-the prohibitions con-
cerned activities in which the signatories had never engaged. One of
those activities-the testing of nuclear weapons on celestial bodies-
had in fact already been prohibited by the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty.264 On the other hand, just as with the 1971 Seabed Treaty,
the powers stopped short of complete demilitarization of all activity
in outer space and celestial bodies, leaving themselves sufficient free-
dom to engage in activities of immediate strategic interest. For
example, under the 1971 Seabed Treaty, the powers are free to
develop mobile underwater armament systems within the territorial
sea265 and, under the Outer Space Treaty, the powers are free to
develop and deploy orbital non-nuclear weapons systems.266 The
This statement leaves it unclear as to whether the Soviet Union reserves a right to
retaliate with space weapons only if it is attacked from space, or regardless of from where
it is attacked. The statement seems to pave the way for the argument that a state can
retaliate with space weapons against targets on earth even if it is the victim of a purely
earth-based attack.
264. See Test Ban Treaty, supra note 37, at art. 1.
265. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
One commentator, taking a strongly pessimistic view, argues that the Outer Space
Treaty will not contribute toward law and order in space and is a mere "window-dress-
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Outer Space Treaty also fails to regulate the development and use of
land-based weapons systems capable of launching missiles which
pass through space en route to targets on land.
The regime of demilitarization that the Outer Space Treaty
actually posits is, at best, a modest one that in many respects patterns
pre-existing state conduct. The Treaty's drafters, no doubt con-
cerned about the Treaty's long-term viability, had no intention of
instituting a radical regime of non-militarization in disregard of
present realities and the internal dynamics of the world power
balance.
In the short-term, therefore, the Outer Space Treaty has been
and will continue to be effective in meeting its immediate goal of
prohibiting the militarization of celestial bodies. As to the future
prospects of weapons in circumterrestrial space, one may not inter-
pret the Treaty to prohibit the development of such weapons. The
Outer Space Treaty should not be criticized, however, for not lead-
ing to a result that it was never intended to achieve.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
AND OUTER SPACE: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The foregoing sections examined the regimes of demilitarization
in the oceans (including the ocean floor) and outer space (including
celestial bodies). Neither regime purports to achieve complete
demilitarization, and in some instances they prohibit that which is
under no immediate need of prohibition.267 Treaty law with respect
to both regimes is lacking. The 1971 Seabed Treaty does not greatly
affect the strategic forces of either of the two military powers.
Although it bans the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-
bed,268 it permits mobile underwater weapons systems. 269 It also
fails to regulate activity in those maritime zones falling under the
traditional scheme of national waters: the territorial sea, the contig-
uous zone, and the continental shelf.270 Nor does the Draft Conven-
tion of UNCLOS III make any significant changes in the existing
regime of sovereignty over these zones. The Draft Convention does
not restrict the traditional freedoms of the high seas involving navi-
ing" arrangement behind which the space powers will continue to pursue whatever activ-
ity they choose. R. Mankiewicz, Interpretation of the Treaty on Outer Space, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 82, 82-83
(1968).
267. See supra notes 147-48 & 263-64 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 69-72 aid accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
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gation and the immunity of warships.271 Further, in relation to
activities on the seabed, there is nothing contained in the draft arti-
cles to compel a departure from the way that such activities on the
sea surface have been treated.
The scheme of verification under the 1971 Seabed Treaty,
272
being operative on a national rather than an international level, has
an inherent disability. With the signing of the Draft Convention of
UNCLOS III, wide zones of exclusive national jurisdiction will
emerge-consisting chiefly of twelve-mile territorial seas and 200-
mile exclusive economic zones.273 The wider the zones of national
jurisdiction, the more difficult it becomes for any scheme of national
or international verification to operate effectively. In sum, neither
document will have a significant impact on the preservation of the
oceans from the arms race.
Some of the Outer Space Treaty provisions are also open to crit-
icism. While it seeks to preserve the present state of total non-milita-
rization of celestial bodies, the Treaty achieves only partial
demilitarization of circumterrestrial space. 274 Verification is possible
only on the moon and other celestial bodies, not in outer space or
even on earth-based centers.275 Where verification is possible (Ze.,
on the Moon and other celestial bodies), it is with respect to a ban
which again is not of much importance to the strategic forces of the
space powers. 276
The foregoing review of the effectiveness of international law in
the preservation of the high seas ahd outer space as zones of peace
not only reveals the principal strengths and weaknesses in current
international law, but it also suggests future avenues of reform. An
agenda for future lawmaking for the demilitarization of the oceans
and outer space should include the following requirements: (1) a
reduction in the quality and quantity of mobile underwater strategic
forces (nuclear and conventional) and, possibly, their eventual elimi-
nation; (2) a reduction in the quality and quantity of non-nuclear
orbital weapons systems in circumterrestrial space and, possibly,
their eventual proscription; (3) the inclusion in the ban of the seabed
and superjacent waters of the entire twelve-mile zone of coastal
states; but if this proves unacceptable, the restriction of the width of
271. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 218-19 & 237-38 and accompanying text. It is ironic that verifica-
tion as to compliance with the ban on nuclear and mass destruction weapons would not
be possible under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. See supra note 219.
276. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
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the territorial sea within very narrow limits, bearing in mind that the
more narrow the territorial sea, the wider the area of international
surveillance and control; (4) the development of a scheme of
unrestricted and compulsory international (rather than just national)
verification of state activity in the oceans and in outer space; (5) the
definition of the nature and location of purely passive, listening,
scanning and observation devices, underwater along pre-determined
lines of coastal proximity, and in outer space in accordance with pre-
determined orbits around the earth; and (6) the prohibition of the
national appropriation of international ocean space in general
(including the surface and columns of water beneath the surface).
The foregoing review also reveals that peace cannot be legis-
lated into place through a crusade for reform of the existing treaty
law. Any zeal for reform will have to be tempered by a sober appre-
ciation of the fact that, under the present system of international
organization, what is desirable may not always be practicable. One
of the best guides as to that which is practicable is actual state con-
duct (and the reasons and policies behind it), and an acceptance of
the fact that competing state claims are legitimized or tolerated
depending on the degree to which they approximate the commonly
accepted ideal of peace and justice. This basic premise suggests the
approach, advocated by the present writer, that state conduct is an
important guide in the interpretation of the current law of peace on
the high seas and in outer space.
Observation of the present system of international relations
shows that international peace and order does, in many important
respects, rest on a balance of power and mutual deterrence between
states. In the absence of a strong central authority charged with the
responsibility of enforcing international peace, the development of
offensive and defensive weapons systems on land, in the seas, and in
space must be recognized as an important dynamic in the preserva-
tion of this global balance of power. The balance cannot be "abol-
ished" by treaty law.
Instead, the current trend of the relevant treaty law is to freeze
the status quo, leaving the option of achieving demilitarization and
disarmament for future stages.277 Thus, the sea and space treaties do
277. An example is the recently negotiated Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty of 1979
(SALT II). While the 1971 Seabed Treaty prohibits the emplacement of stationary
nuclear weapons or missiles on the ocean floor, SALT II proposes to prohibit the devel-
opment, testing or deployment of stationary or mobile strategic nuclear missiles designed
to be placed on, or able to move in contact with, any part of the ocean floor, including
portions that are subjacent to internal waters. Article IX of the proposed treaty (which
has not yet come into force) provides:
(1) Each party undertakes not to develop, teft, or deploy:
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not ban mobile underwater strategic forces or orbital weapons sys-
tems. What the treaties do ban is the deployment of nuclear weap-
ons and weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, in
circumterrestrial space and on celestial bodies. This by itself is a
significant achievement. If the seas and outer space are to be
reserved for peaceful purposes, however, the law will have to go
much further.
(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launches for emplacement on the ocean
floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the
sub-soil thereof, or mobile launches of such missiles, which move only in contact
with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters,
or missiles for such launches. ...
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lis on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed June 18, 1979, Selected Docu-
ments No. 12A, 26, 41 (Bureau of Public Affairs, Dep't of State).

